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THE KILLING TrmE:
A HISTORY OF ABORIGINAL RESISTANCE IN
COLONIAL AUSTRALIA
Sidney L. Harring*
The traditional legal history of Aboriginal
Australia is the history of a racist doctrine of
terra nullius, ofan empty land where Aboriginal
people had no legal right to their lands and,
indeed, few legal rights as human beings. There
is, however, another way to constructAboriginal
legal history, raised by the Australian Supreme
Court in Mabo v. Queensland. This requires
drawing out an understanding of the legal
meaning ofthe absence oflaw, or ofthe choice of
the state to use non-legal means to accomplish
policy ends. The argument follows that we can
discover legal meaning in the actions of
Aboriginal peoples and that this legal meaning
must be incorporated into the common law of
Aboriginalrights because otheravenues ofaccess
to the common law were closed to Aboriginal
peoples up to, and even including, the late
twentieth century. The oppositeposition, reflected
in a traditional common law interpretive
framework, limits the scope ofthe common law to
narrowand racist opinions ofnineteenth century
judges, andrestricts modern common lawjudges
to a one-sided and colonial common law that is
incompatible with a modern view ofhuman rights
and a pluralist view of the place of Aboriginal
people and their history in twentieth century
nations. This article attempts to make this
argument relative to the legal conflict over the
ownership of pastoral lands in Australia by
analyzing both the legal meaning of the violent
conflict between Aboriginal tribes and colonial
settlers in the mid-nineteenth century, and the
various attempts ofAustralian legal authorities
of the time to place these events within a common
law legalframeworl
L'histoire traditionnelle du droit qui a ragi les
Autochtones d'Australie est l'histoire d'une
doctrine raciste de terra nullius, d'un territoire
vacant oit lesAutochtones n 'avatent aucun droit
ldgal depossider leurs terres et, d vrai dire, peu
de droits lgaux en tant qu'gtres humains. Ily a
cependant une autre approche interpratative de
l'histoiredu droit autochtone, quia t invoquae
par la Coursuprme de lAustralie dans l'affaire
Mabo c. Queensland. Cetteapprocheexigequ'on
en vienne ,d comprendre lasignificationjuridique
de l'absence du droit ou celle du choix oparapar
l'tat qui a dacidd d'utiliser des moyens non
juridiques pour atteindre les objectifs de ses
politiques. 1 s'ensuit qu'on peut avancer qu'il
estpossible de dacouvrir la significationjuridique
des actesdesAutochtones etque cettesignification
juridique doit 6tre intagrae 6 la common law
relative aux droits des Autochtones, parce que
les autres votes d'acc s d la common law ont &6
fermaes aux Autochtonesjusqu 'a lafin, et mime
pendant lafin, du vingtijme siacle. La position
contraire, que reflate un cadre traditionnel
d'interprtation de la common law, limite la
portae de la common law aux opinions 6troites et
racistes des juges du dix-neuvijme siacle et
confine lesjuges qui appliquent la common law
aujourd'hui dans une common law partiale et
coloniale qui est incompatible avec une vision
moderne des droits de la personne et une vision
pluraliste de laplace que devraient occuper les
nations Autochtones et leur histoire au sein des
nations du vingtiame siacle. Cet article essaie
d'appliquer cet argument au conflitjuridique
touchant lapropridta depdturages en Australie.
L'article analyse aussi bien la signification
juridique du conflit violent qui a eu lieu entre les
tribus autochtones et les colons au milieu du dix-
neuviame siacle, que les diverses tentatives des
autoritgs juridiques australiennes de l'apoque
visant d situer ces 6vanements dans le cadre
juridique de la common law.
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The place of native people in the history of Australia is being rewritten in all areas
and clearly includes redefining their legal position. A traditional view, that Aborigines
peacefully stepped aside, ceding their lands as terra nullius to British settlers, is now
discredited, but still looms largeinAustralian history andpolitical andlegal consciousness.
"The aborigines were known to attack isolated herdsmen....In general, however, they
were peaceable and did not greatly impede the activities of settlers, although they
aroused their concern."' Recent historical writing has produced a massive literature
documenting Aboriginal resistance to the imposition of a white colonial legal order on
Australia, as hundreds, perhaps more than a thousand whites were speared or clubbed
by Aborigines in defense of their lands and their ultures.2 A figure of 20,000 violent
Aboriginal deaths at the hands of whites has been advanced by Henry Reynolds, with
data to support it.3
This resistance has a much broader meaning than is within the scope of traditional
legal history, but, nevertheless, its core was a legal conflict, manifested in hundreds of
cases in the Australian courts and thousands of official actions by officials acting under
colour of law. In the Melbourne Supreme Court in 1841 Sandford Bolden, a Port Fairy
District settler, was charged with "whipping and shooting blacks to drive them off his
station." While mustering his stock, Bolden had come upon a native man, with his wife
and child. Suspecting that they had either stolen some of his stock or intended to do so,
Bolden fired a shot atthe man, who fled, wounded, toward a waterhole. Bolden returned
home, secured a pistol, returned to the waterhole and fired again at the man, whose body
rolled under the water and was never recovered.4 Mr. Justice Willis upheld Bolden's
legal right to defend his property: "If a party receives a license from Government to
occupy a run, and any person white orblack come on [the] run forthe purpose ofstealing
my property, I have a right to drive them off by every lawful means....The blacks have
no right to trespass unless there is a special clause in the license from the Government. ' 5
I B.H. Fletcher, Landed Enterprise and Penal Society: A History ofFarmning and Grazing in
New South Wales Before 1821 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976) at 180. This is one of only two
references to "aborigines" in this leading history of early agriculture in New South Wales, a land that
was entirely Aboriginal at the outset of this study. The other reference, at 157, is to substantially the
same effect, a colonial officer's representation that Aborigines in the Newcastle area were "unlikely
to prove troublesome".
2 H. Reynolds, The OtherSide ofthe Frontier (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1982) and
C.D. Rowley, The Destruction ofAboriginal Society (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1972) are
the best known of these works. Others include G. Reid, A Nest of Hornets (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1982); R. Evans, K. Saunders & K. Cronin, Exclusion, Exploitation andEtermination:
Race Relations in Colonial Queensland (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Co., 1975); N.
Loos, Invasion and Resistance (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University Press, 1982); J.
Critchett, A 'Distant Field of Murder' (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1990); A.
Markus, From the Barrel of a Gun: The Oppression of the Aborigines, 1860-1900 (Melbourne:
Victorian Historical Association, 1974); B. Nance, "The Level ofViolence: Europeans and Aborigines
in Port Phillip, 1835-1850" (1980-1981) 19 Historical Studies 532; C. Turnbull, Black War: The
Extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1965).
H. Reynolds, Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers andLand (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987) at 53.
4 H.F. Behan, Mr. Justice Willis (Glen Iris, Victoria: privately printed, 1979) at 116-18.
5 Frontier, supra note 3 at 150.
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Within a few generations, virtually all the land in Australia had been leased outto settlers
in huge grants by colonial authorities acting under the colour of Australian and British
law, with no regard for Aboriginal land lights.
6
The legal meaning of this forcible occupation of Aboriginal lands is still the subject
of dispute, most recently in Mabo v. Queensland.7 There the High Court explicitly
grappled with two kinds of legal history: first the history of the positive law of Australia
on the rights of Aboriginals, but, perhaps equally important, the Court was forced to
address the legal meaning of an absence of law, the silence of the positive law on most
matters of Aboriginal rights in Australia.' For six judges, no legal meaning could be
deduced from the failure of nineteenth century Australia to provide directly some legal
scheme for the alienation of Aboriginal land.9 For one judge, the direct action of British
and Australian officials in legalizing the occupation ofvirtually all of Australia by whites
was an assertion of Crown sovereignty inconsistent with any Aboriginal land rights
whatever.'0 Similarly, the Royal Commission onAboriginal Deaths inCustodyrepeatedly
returned to historical factors, including the denial of self government and sovereignty,
and the forcible deprivation of their lands, as root causes of Aboriginal poverty,
depression, and violence, thus underlying the contemporary problem of deaths in
custody."
The now reputed doctrine of terra nullius, the idea that Australia was an empty land
that became the property of its discoverer, has its equivalency in Australian legal history,
a kind of empty legal history of native rights in nineteenth century Australian law. A re-
examination of that legal history, however, shows a very different picture, one of
substantial legal activity. This article begins with an examination of existing scholarly
work on the legal history of native people in nineteenth century Australia. It then moves
on to analyze the legal position of Aborigines in the nineteenth century, first through a
6 Fletcher, supra note 1.
7 (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1,107 A.L.R. 1 [hereinafterMabo cited to A.L.R.]. An annotated version
of the opinion is R. Bartlett, The Mabo Decision and the full text of the decision in Mabo and Ors v.
Queensland, with commentary by Richard Bartlett (Sydney: Butterworths, 1993).
8 For a discussion of the context of the case see M. Manwaring, "A Small Step or a Giant Leap?
The Implications ofAustralia's First Judicial Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights" (1993) 34 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 177. See also M. Goot and T. Rowse, Make a Better Offer: The Politics ofMabo (Leichhard,
N.S.W.: Pluto Press, 1994) and M.A. Stephenson and S. Ratnapala, Mabo: A Judicial Revolution (St.
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993). A special issue on Mabo was published in (1993) 15
Sydney L. Rev. at 121-223.
9 See e.g. the concurring opinion of Deane and Gaudron in Mabo, supra note 7 at 94: "The
practical inability of the native inhabitants of a British Colony to vindicate any common law title by
legal action in the event of threatened or actual wrongful conduct on the part ofthe Crown or its agents
did not, however, mean that the common law's recognition of that title was unimportant from the
practical point of view."
10 See the dissenting opinion of Dawson J., ibid. at 138: "The extinction of aboriginal title does
not, therefore, require specific legislation....there is no reason in principle or logic why it should not
be inferred from the course taken by the Crown in the exercise of its powers...."
"1 The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody produced more than a hundred
reports of several types. Many are formal reports of specific deaths, often including historical factors.
Others are various technical papers, done by outside experts. The letters patent of the Commission
included a mandate to investigate the "root causes" ofAboriginal deaths in custody. See Australia, The




consideration of the case law, then through the evolution of the law of evidence, and
finallybringing thesethemes together withthe consideration ofone importantunreported
case that illustrates both the problems and opportunities of a reinterpretation of the legal
history of Aborigines in Australia.
II. ABORIGINES IN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY
These two opposing views raise a number of questions about the meaning of
Aborigines in Australian legal history. There is a substantial body of literature in this
field, but it is unsatisfactory. By and large it is still hardly more than descriptive of the
obvious: native Australians were murdered by whites acting either under the law, or
outside of the law, with the law making little difference and providing little protection
for native rights.
For Henry Reynolds, the foremost scholar of the dispossession of native people in
Australia, "throughout 60 or 70 years ofmurderous dispossessionthe law was impotent".
This "impotence" is best measured, in Reynold's analysis, in inactivity. "[N]o colonial
court ever defended the Aboriginal right of occupancy. Without enforcement there was
no litigation. Without litigation there were no judicial attempts to define Aboriginal
rights; no dicta; no precedents; no case law."'" Surely no one can deny the evidentiary
base of Reynold's inference. It has made its way into twentieth century Australian legal
doctrine in Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., through the most base ofjudicial inferences:
since no case law on Aboriginal rights was created during this period, the court held that
these rights had been extinguished.' 3 The relative lack of nineteenth century cases on
Aboriginal legal rights does, in fact, characterize Australian law, distinguishing it from
the legal development of the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, the
other colonial-settler societies. 4
The inactivity of the law, however, can be interpreted in other ways besides
"impotence". Alex Castles, among Australia's leading legal historians and author ofthe
standard work on Australian legal history, used the term "ambivalence" rather than
"impotent" to describe Australian law on the status of Aborigines. 5 This is a different
way of seeing the law in the shaping of Aboriginal/white relations, for "ambivalence"
involves a legal order that is "potent" but not being used in a consistent and instrumental
way to effect legal outcomes. This could reflect a powerful legal order, for example, in
the hands of opposing political forces, or of judges and lawmakers divided by
inconsistent legal approaches to issues. Castles himself acknowledges this, stating that
12 Frontier, supra note 3 at 156.
13 (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141, [1972-1973] A.L.R. 65 [hereinafter Milirrpum cited to F.L.R.]. This
argument is Reynold's in Frontier, ibid.
14 The United States has nearly 1,000 reported cases on Indian rights before 1900, covering the
full spectrum ofsubstantive areas of law. Canada, nearer in population to Australia, has more than 100,
52 in Ontario alone. Even though this number is much smaller, again the full spectrum of substantive
areas of law is represented. See S. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal
Law, and United States Law in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994); and 'The Liberal Treatment of Indians': Native People in Nineteenth Century Ontario Law"
(1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 297.
15 A.C. Castles, An Australian Legal History (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1982) at 522.
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"formany years the situation ofthe Aborigines in relation to European law seems to have
been largely a matter of chance."' 6
Enid Russell took a more concrete position not far from this "ambivalence" view
by positing that "the legal position of aboriginal natives in Western Australia varied
depending upon which oftwo approaches was uppermost at any given moment." These
two approaches juxtaposed that ofthe Home Office and "humanitarians", favouring the
legal position that Aboriginals were full legal citizens under the law, entitled to all the
rights of Englishmen, with the "average settler", who preferred to keep the Aboriginal
outside of the law in matters of "rights", but was willing to apply the "disadvantages"
of law to native people when it came to criminal punishment and the expropriation of
land.' 7 This view makes legal policy a matter of choice, reflecting the legal positions of
two distinct sets of political and economic interests.
David Neal, whose Rule ofLaw in a Penal Colony is the most detailed legal history
of early New South Wales, gives the law more credibility and power, and sees greater
complexity in the relationship between colonial law and Aborigines. The law "stood
behind [the] forceful dispossession" of native people, while, at the same time, providing
legal protections for their rights that were "largely illusory"." "Largely" is, of course,
a slippery adverb meaning that the law was not entirely illusory nor, when used by
Castles, meaning European law was not applied to Aboriginals entirely by chance. This
recognition sets the stage for a study of the processes through which law mattered in
structuring Aboriginal/white relations in New South Wales, and Australia generally.
Barry Bridges, whose work on the early legal history ofNew South Wales offers the
most detailed analysis of the place of native people in colonial law, holds that little
thought was given to the place of natives in the colony. Therefore, law evolved in a
reactive way to meet the exigencies of frontier conflict almost on a case by case basis,
at least until the late 1830s when a clearpolicy emerged. 9 Like Neal's work, this model
posits colonial law as a powerful instrument in the structuring of native/white relations.
This view is also held by John McCorquodale, in his encyclopedic, but analytically
disappointing dissertation, "Aborigines: A History of Law and Injustice, 1829-1985".
The nineteenth century analysis is not developed in any depth, beyond proving the major
theme that Australian law was unjust to Aborigines and a significant instrument in the
exploitation and domination of Aboriginal people.
21
It is important to see that "law" as applied to native people is not a monolithic
construct. Rather, specific kinds of law were applied (or ignored) in a wide variety of
different contexts. The most basic distinction that can be made is between the application
16 Ibid. at 520.
'7 E. Russell,A History ofthe Law in Western Australia andlts Developmentfrom 1829 to 1979
(Nedlands, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 1980) at 313.
IS D. Neal, The Rule ofLaw in a Penal Colony (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
at 78.
19 B. Bridges, "The Aborigines and the Law: New South Wales, 1788-1855" (1970) 4 Teaching
History 40 [hereinafter "Aborigines and the Law"]; "The Extension of English Lawto the Aborigines
for Offences Committed Inter Se, 1829-1842" (1974) 59 Journal of the Royal Australian Historical
Society 264 [hereinafter "Extension of English Law"]; "The Aborigines and the Land Question: New
South Wales in the Period of Imperial Responsibility" (1971) 56 Journal of the Royal Australian
Historical Society 92; "Sir George Gipps and William Lee's Squatting Licence, 1842" (1969) 3
Teaching History 32.
20 J. McCorquodale (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New England, 1985).
[Vol. 26:2
The Killing Time
of British criminal law and civil law to natives: British authorities were applying British
criminal law to natives without specific authority to do so, even in the late eighteenth
century, and in the face of strong disagreement among British officials of both the
legality and appropriateness of doing so." At the same time, the obvious logic that if
Aborigines were British subjects for purposes of the penal law, they must have full civil
rights also, including some title to their lands, was not applied anywhere in Australia,
although it was too obvious an idea to be ignored by contemporary Australians.2 Paul
Hasluck captured the essence of this contradiction as "still Black, though British":
although the rights of Aboriginals as "British subjects" were acknowledged this had no
meaning as a general proposition in law.23 Rather, it had to be applied, on a case by case
basis, the myriad range ofspecific disputes that came before the courts, or specific policy
issues that came to the attention of colonial officials. There can be no question that the
outcomes of those decision making processes were inconsistent with the abstract idea
that Black Australians were entitled to the full legal rights of the British.
Once we recognize that law, in fact, existed as a powerful force in structuring
colonial society in nineteenth century New South Wales, the "impotence" and
"ambivalence" of law take on new meaning. Such outcomes reflect legal choices, or the
choice of colonial officials not to use law in circumstances involving Aboriginal rights,
situations where they might have done otherwise. Put more crudely, legal history
involves both "law" and "outlaw", with choices to remain outside ofthe law (orto refrain
from resorting to the law) being legal choices nevertheless, the subject matter of legal
history.
The matter of greatest difficulty in discussing the emergence of a coherent
nineteenth century law and legal policy applying to native people is in constructing the
roles of the natives themselves in making that law. The nineteenth century sources are
replete with acknowledgement of the fact that the Aborigines had their own systems of
legal norms, and were using this law to resolve disputes with whites. There can be no
doubt that Aboriginal law shaped the Australian law ofnative rights. Yet, because of the
diverse range of Aboriginal cultures and social systems, and because of the lack of the
parallel records of Aboriginal legal activity that exist for white legal activity, it is not a
simple matter to write about Aboriginal law.
The analysis which follows attempts to outline an approach to understanding the
legal history of Aborigines under British and Australian (hereafter called simply
"Australian") law. This legal history can no longer be dismissed as not "significant
except as curiosities of Australian legal history," as it was by Justice Blackburn in
Milirrpum.24 Rather, as both the legal discourse inMilirrpum andMabo, and the political
debate about Aboriginal rights makes clear, the legal history of Aboriginal people in
Australia has important implications forpresent legal policy. This legal history, in turn,
runs distinct, but interrelated courses through specific policy areas.
21 This issue is discussed infra note 22.
n H. Reynolds, The Law of the Land (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1987) is the best
discussion of nineteenth century Australian controversy over Aboriginal land rights.
13 P. Hasluck, Black Australians: A Survey of Native Policy in Western Australia, 1829-1897
(Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1970).
24 Milirrpum, supra note 13 at 262.
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The single most important legal policy area in nineteenth century Aboriginal/white
relations was the control of interracial violence, reflected in an important debate about
the place ofAboriginals in Australian criminal law. This debate, with related legal issues
such as the extension of British criminal law to intra-aboriginal offenses, the proper
scope ofthe law ofself-defense in the context of frontier violence, and the law regulating
the giving of evidence by Aborigines, pre-emptedthe legal discussion ofAboriginal land
rights. Itwas clearly relatedto the land questionbecause so much ofthe violence, perhaps
virtually all ofit, stemmed from the white intrusion on Aboriginal lands, an intrusion that
was both a violation of Aboriginal law and, often, a violation of Australian law. Even
when this intrusion was "legal" under Australian law, the means of carrying it out often
exceeded the bounds of the law.
Given the violence of the first fifty years of contact, the importance ofthe criminal
law in structuring Aboriginal/white Australian relations cannot be underestimated. Both
the case law and policy discussion make it clear that the issues of native criminal
responsibility under British law dominated the legal discourse of nineteenth century
native rights, to the exclusion of land rights issues. This choice is not an accident, but
reflects boththe political and economic foundations ofthe white Australian law ofnative
rights.
Much of the confusion in the interpretation of the early meaning of Australian law
as applied to Aborigines stems from criminal cases. The legal authorities in Australia in
the period before the 1840s attempted every kind of legal policy toward the criminal
legal responsibility of natives that was used anywhere in the British Empire, a chaotic
legal free-for-all. Yet this was done in the context of a rigid legal hierarchy, tightly
controlled by Governors who exercised near dictatorial powers and paid close attention
to legal matters. These colonies were, after all, frontier penal colonies and matters of
"law and order" were ofthe highest political importance.' While most ofthe formalities
of British law were extended to these colonies, the Governor was put in charge of an
abbreviated, efficient legal apparatus, capable of the large number of quick trials
necessary to punish convictlawbreakers. Largenumbers ofdeath sentences were handed
out, and court-ordered whippings were so frequent that the number of lashes is
staggering: 344,000 in one year. It was a brutal legal order.26 Too much can be made of
the "convict society" theme and its legal meaning, but it is important to locate the search
for a legal model for the incorporation of Aborigines into Australian society in the
context of this unique colonial-settler society. For example, from the beginning British
authorities found the convicts, loose ofprison bonds in a very large land, were difficult
to control, often beyond the reach of the law.27
All legal historians of colonial New South Wales cite Governor Arthur Phillip's
instructions on the treatment of Aborigines: native people were to be protected in their
persons and customs. 28 Phillip, to his credit, lived up to this model by ordering his troops
2 Neal, supra note 18.
26 R. Hughes, The Fatal Shore: A History ofthe Transportation ofConvicts to Australia, 1787-
1868 (London: Collins Harvill, 1987).
27 J.B. Hirst, Convict Society and Its Enemies: A History of Early New South Wales (Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, 1983). Hirst's thesis is that the "convict society" created in Australia contained within
it great contradictions that ultimately lead to its democratization. This theme is elaborated in The
Strange Birth of ColonialDemocracy: New South Wales 1848-1884 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
28 HistoricalRecords ofAustralia (Sydney: Government Printer) at i, 1, 48 [hereinafter H.R.A.].
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to refrain from pursuing Aborigines who committed assaults and property offenses
against whites, even resisting reprisal when he was speared in the shoulder.29 Little
thought had been given to the place ofthe native inhabitants ofAustralia. Partly, it seems,
this was due to bad British intelligence, their belief in the fiction of terra nullius, the idea
that there was only a small native population which would disappear into the vast land.
To the extent that there was a policy based on British experience, it was based on
British experience with Indians in the United States and Canada. While, previous to the
governorship of Sir George Gipps (1837-1845), this did not mean a serious attempt at
direct exportation of policy, there can be no question that the officials in the Colonial
Office who handed down general instructions on native policy were primarily informed
by Britain's extensive North American colonial experience: Britain in the late eighteenth
century essentially had only colonial experience in North America, the Carribean, the
Cape Colony, Guyana and India.30 Canadian Indian policy was essentially one of a
controlled frontier, minimizing white-Indian conflict by holding whites strictly
accountable to the rule of law, and, at the same time, primarily through economic
mechanisms, gradually incorporating the Indians into colonial society.3'
The legal framework for such a model begins with effective legal control of the
white population, a legal framework that has nothing to do with native people. There can
be no question that British authorities in Australia failed to gain effective legal control
of frontier whites, thereby setting up an interactive process of white attacks on
Aborigines andtheirreprisals, directed accordingto customarylaw. Thiswas recognized
at the time, with commentators noting that Aboriginal violence was almost entirely due
to white attacks on them, white kidnappings of Aboriginal women, and white seizure of
Aboriginal land that left tribes at the point of starvation. 32 While the complete motivation
for native actions cannot be known, their legal history can be written by inference from
the patterns of their resistance.
The confusion of colonial white legal models reflected, not the lack of seriousness
about the rule of law of colonial policy makers, but the failure of colonial authorities to
evergain effective control offrontierwhites. This pervades nineteenth century Australian
law, finding embodiment in the bush rangers, recurrent trouble over the rights of
"squatters", the failure to incorporate native people into the frontier social order, and
continuing frontier violence.
Native legal rights in late nineteenth century Australia were substantially reduced
from earlier in the century. Through the 1830s, approaching fifty years after first
settlement, the various models of native rights were openly debated, with legal policy
19 Frontier, supra note 3 at 32-38; G.B. Barton, History of New South Wales, vol. I (Sydney:
Government Printer, 1889) at 124.
11 Irish UniversityPress Series ofBritishParliamentaryPapers:Anthropology/Aborigines, vol.
I (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1982) contains a number of 1836 reports on "Aborigines" in the
colonies. These reports refer largely to Canada, Cape Colony, the United States, Guyana and Australia.
They were gathered in the process of fact-finding by the UK, Select Committee on Aborigines (British
Settlements) of the House of Commons and used as the basis for its Report, 26 June 1837 [hereinafter
"Select Committee"].
31 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History ofIndian-White Relations in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
32 This is clearly the view of Governor Phillip, repeatedly expressed from his first year in
Australia cited in H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, 1, 48, 62, 96, and 145.
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makers taking the full range of positions that characterize nineteenth century common
law thought on native rights. Thus, native civil rights, even land rights, are subject to
some measure of recognition. By the decade of the 1840s, this discussion has changed
and Aborigines are left substantially deprived of their legal rights, the mere objects of
law. The following analysis will examine the pre-1840s law, arguably a foundation for
current law, primarily in New South Wales, but also considering the rest of Australia.
III. BRITISH CRIMINAL LAW, ABORIGINES, AND WHITE SETTLEMENT
Perhaps the clearest way to show both the seriousness of the attempt to impose a
legal framework on Aboriginal/white relations and the failure of that model is to look
at the criminal law, the best documented area ofthe legal history of Australian relations
with native people. Three distinct legal relationships are intertwined in this process: the
accountability ofwhite settlers to British law for offenses committed against Aborigines;
the accountability of Aborigines for offenses against whites; and inter se offenses
between Aborigines. The law embodying these issues was subject to a considerable
amount of discussion in colonial Australia with it being understood that existing law was
not effective in resolving problems of colonial violence.
A. The Legal Control of White Settler and Convict Violence Against Aborigines
The legal issues underlying the accountability of whites for offenses against
Aborigines are the simplest: there is no question British law had such authority over
white colonists, nor any question that those to whom the law applied were cognizant of
the scope of the law. Governor Phillip's first pronouncement of legal policy on these
issues was clear: Aborigines were under the full protection of British law and white
settlers were required to respect Aboriginal life and property. The public policy reason
for this was clear: the government wanted to avoid frontier conflict provoked by white
mistreatment of natives.
33
Althoughthe basicintegrity ofGovemorArthurPhillip's administration in enforcing
this lawhas been questioned, it seems, on balance, thatthe governmentwas serious about
enforcing it.34 There are early reports ofwhippings ordered on convicts who stole native
personal property: canoes, fishing equipment, and the like.35 Although an efficient form
33 Historical Records ofNew South Wales (Sydney: Government Printer, 1896) at i, II, 89 and
ii, 230 [hereinafterH.R.N.S. W.]. A full discussion of Phillip's early native policy is in K. Willey, When
the Sky FellDown: The Destruction ofthe Tribes ofthe SydneyRegion, 1788-1850's (Sydney: Collins,
1979).
34 Frontier, supra note 3 at 35. Here it must be conceded that it cannot be proven that Reynolds
is wrong in his view that Phillip was not serious about enforcing British law to protect Aboriginal
rights. Rather, it is a question of making inferences from (a) Phillip's actual failure to protect
Aborigines; and (b) severe attacks against Aborigines that Phillip himself ordered. It seems clear that
Phillip could not even protect his own storehouses from convicts, losing "twelve thousand in weight"
and eventually hanging six convicts who "had the key" and robbed the main storehouse every night
for months. See H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, I, 144. Regarding his own attacks on Aborigines, there is
no question that he, in common with all British governors everywhere, viewed the state's monopoly
on violence as legitimate, justifying official attacks on Aborigines, at the same time criminalizing the




of British lav was provided for at the very first stages ofsettlement with a hybrid system
of military courts for convict discipline, it did not reach very far into the settler's social
order, and settlers, particularly convicts, were able to engage in a great amount of
criminal activity directed at Aborigines without being apprehended and punished.36 The
very essence of the convict society was maintaining a self-preserving set of norms
independent of the law, most often secretly. Therefore, the convicts built a social order
oftheir own, invisible to the authorities who were distrusted, emphasizingthe maximization
of whatever benefits the poor colony offered.3 7 Even food rations were often scarce, so
the procurement of aboriginal hunting and fishing bounties was important.38 A pattern
of theft, kidnapping of women, and assaults on Aborigines who "got in the way" led to
the dynamic pattern of injury and reprisal that characterized black-white relations in
nineteenth century Australia: the killing time.
39
The essence ofthe problem ofwhite killings ofAborigines and the law is that convict
society was largely beyond the reach of the law, protected by both distance and a code
of silence. Phillip reported this as early as July of 1788, describing the spearing of a
convict "searching for vegetables", who witnessed another convict speared in the head
and carried off. Although stating that the convict "denied giving the natives any
provocation" his contemporary writings make it clearthat he believed these attacks were
caused by convict mistreatment ofAborigines.4° By the time ofthe Hawkesbury killings
of 1799, the brutal murder by settlers of "two native boys" eleven years after first
colonization, it was already clear that settlers were beyond the reach of the law in their
predatory behaviour against Aborigines. The Hawkesbury killings were the first white
murders of natives subject to the full process of colonial law and illustrate the law's
impotence in protecting Aborigines from white killers.
The original Sydney settlement had access to little agricultural land, a disadvantage
leading to poor diets and hunger in the early days of the colony.4' The valley of the
316 On the early legal system of New South Wales see L.A. Whitfeld, Founders of the Law in
Australia (Sydney: Butterworths, 1971) at 3-22; H. Golder, High and Responsible Office: A History
of the NSWMagistracy (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 1991).
37 This is the thesis of Hirst in Convict Society and Its Enemies, supra note 27.
38 In fact, the initial reason for the British loss of control of the convicts was the necessity of
sending the convicts into the bush to forage for food, the single most provocative action the
government took that inherently led to conflict with Aborigines, conflict completely beyond the
control of the authorities. As early as July, 1788, scarcely five months after the founding of the penal
colony, Phillip wrote that a convict had been killed by natives, but had been seen earlier in the
possession of a native canoe, which he presumably had stolen. Thus, for Phillip, "the natives were not
the aggressors". See H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, 1, 48. Three months later, in October of 1788, Phillip
reported theproblem ofconvicttheft ofnative hunting and fishing equipmentthatwas sold ontheboats
as souvenirs. In spite oftheprospect ofpunishment for"receiving stolen goods" the practice continued
unabated. See H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, I, 96.
39 J. Cribbin, The Killing Times (Sydney: Fontana Books, 1984). While Cribbin uses the phrase,
"the killing times" narrowly to refer to the Coniston massacre, it more appropriately refers to the initial
period of black/white contact, whenever it occurred. See D.S. Trigger, Whitefella Comin': Aboriginal
Responses to Colonialism in Northern Australia (Oakleigh, Victoria: Cambridge University Press,
1992). Trigger calls the period the 'Wild Time'. See c. 2, "'Wild Time': A History of Coercion and
Resistance".
40 See supra notes 28 and 29. By this time, twelve convicts had disappeared. Other than by
disappearing into the ocean, these people, eleven men and one woman, could only have disappeared
into Aboriginal lands.
11 Hughes, supra note 26 at c. 4 "The Starvation Years" at 84-128.
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Hawkesbury River, twenty miles north of Sydney, was a rich plain, suited to all forms
of agriculture. It was thickly settled by Aborigines who resented white intrusion and
there were immediately conflicts.42 In 1796 Governor William Hunter (who had
succeeded Phillip) instructed farmers to gather to protect themselves against natives, but
threatened murder prosecutions for any attempts to shoot Aborigines "without
provocation" beyond, apparently, the common law of self-defense.43 Military parties
were dispatchedto Hawkesbury in 1795 to protect the settlement offour hundred whites
and also to protect the government's monopoly on violence, denying the convicts and
settlers any right to take matters into their own hands.44 The dispatches ordering this
military action are very clear: although the authorities recognized that whites had
provoked the Aboriginal actions by inflicting cruelties on native people, the government
could not afford the abandonment of the agricultural lands there. After five whites were
killed or injured, sixty privates and two officers were ordered to secure the valley.45 The
intent was both to stop further white attacks on Aborigines as well as to prevent native
violence against whites, the Canadian model of the policed frontier.
The bodies of two native boys, the youngest about thirteen years old, were found
by the road between Paramatta and Hawkesbury in September 1799. The hands of both
were tied behind their backs. They had been killed by being hacked by swords, one
beheaded. Five settlers readily admitted the killing, claiming that they acted under
general orders permitting such retaliation.46 The boys, together with other natives, had
come among the farms, offering no resistance at all, but one of their group carried a
musketthat had been taken in a previous attack on whites. Thus, the case was one ofpure
retaliation, not of self-defense. Although the court rejected this defense and found the
men guilty, the seven military officers making up the court could not agree on a sentence,
dividing over the appropriateness of the death penalty. The court granted bail, sending
the men back to their farms, while Governor Hunter wrote to England for instructions.47
The governor acknowledged that he had the power to deny bail to the defendants,
butwas concerned about creating an appearance of a division betweenthe administrative
and judicial branches. The broader issue was one of legal policy for the punishment of
white killers ofAborigines. Referring to "this horrid practice of wantonly destroying the
natives," Governor Hunterreminded the Colonial Office of his duty to protect Aborigines,
repeating his allegation that the Aborigines had been "too often provoked" by cruel
treatment of whites. Although there had been an unknown number of such killings, this
42 R. Milliss, Waterlook Creek (Ringwood, Victoria: McPhee Gribble, 1991) at 48.
43 H.R.N.S. W., supra note 33 at iii, 25.
44 Frontier, supra note 3 at 37.
45 Captain Paterson, a colonial military officer put the matter clearly: "It gives me concern to
have been forced to destroy any of these people, particularly as I have no doubt of their having been
cruelly treated by some ofthe first settlers who went out there; however, had I not taken this step, every
prospect 9f advantage which the colony may expect to derive from a settlement formed on the banks
of so fine a river....would be at an end." See H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, I, 500.
46 H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, II, 401-22 contains a substantially complete transcript of the trial.
The basis of the settler's claim that they believed they were legally empowered to engage in retaliatory
killings against Aborigines is that the military regularly did it and that, when settlers had previously
turned Aborigines suspected of killing whites over to the military, military officers had informedthem
that they would have to release them because they lacked evidence to prosecute them, but, that natives
should be "punished on the spot where taken" (at 5).
4 H.R.A., ibid. at 2.
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was only the second criminal prosecution brought.48 Hunter got no assistance from the
Colonial Office: two years later the offenders were pardoned because of "exceptional
circumstances". 49 But there were no "exceptional circumstances"; these were routine
frontier killings that either had to be accountable under colonial law or not. Finding the
men "guilty" but pardoning them did not neatly straddle a difficult issue; although
preserving the law's jurisdiction over such killings, it rendered it impotent. Moreover,
given the difficulty in gathering evidence from frontiersmen in such cases, this was a rare
case where the court had sufficient evidence to convict settlers of the murder of
Aborigines. It was the Myall Creek massacre trials of 183 8 before murder convictions
were secured against white settlers for the killing of Aborigines.
This failure of British criminal law to punish whites for criminal attacks on
Aborigines was also true in Tasmania and Western Australia. The famous 1828 notice-
board of Governor George Arthur representing graphically the hanging of whites for
killing Aborigines and Aborigines for killing whites was an abstract statement of legal
principle, symbolic in meaning. The Tasmanian authorities failed to proceed with
murder charges against Sweetling, a young man who killed an Aboriginal woman during
a chase. 0 Two reported Western Australian cases ended the same way. John Thompson
shot a native near Albany in 1850. Although the man had thrown one spear and was
preparing to throw another, he was indicted for manslaughter because he had provoked
the incident by mistreatment of native women. The Advocate-General dropped the
charges. Another white man, worried by natives robbing his hut, mixed strychnine with
meal. A child died from cakes made from the meal. The man, charged with murder, was
acquitted by a jury.1'
By the time of the increased levels of violence of the 1830s and 1840s, the threat
of criminal prosecution of whites for killing Aborigines was by no means a dead letter.
Bridge's data shows that sixty-eight whites were committed for prosecution for murder
of Aborigines and fifty-nine were actually tried. Only eighteen were convicted, leading
to a mandatory death sentence, and only nine were actually hanged. Ofthese, seven were
hanged for their roles in the Myall Creek massacre, so the data are distorted by only one
trial. Furthermore, the fifty-nine put on trial includes two trials for seven of the Myall
Creek defendants. 2 These data show that the legal system took jurisdiction over a large
number of killings (although obviously only a fraction of the total white killings of
Aborigines), butwas unable to effectively prosecutethem and couldnotwin convictions.
This failure of prosecution occurred in a context of increasing attention to the
formalities of the rule of law, and an increasing capacity of legal institutions. For
example, convicts gained increasing legal protections throughout this period.13 The
48 The first is not referredto in eitherH.R.A., supra note 28 orH.R.N.S. W., supra note 33. Itwas
tried on October 20, 1797. See "Aborigines and the Law", supra note 19 at 45. Although Bridges gives
no disposition, it could not have led to a conviction, however, and been grouped with the Hawkesbury
killings in Governor Hunter's appeal to London for policy guidance on the future prosecution ofwhites
for killing Aborigines.
49 H.R.N.S.W., supra note 33 at IV, 7.
51 M.C.I. Levy, Governor GeorgeArthur, A ColonialBenevolentDespot (Melbourne: Georgian
House, 1953) at 97-102. This notice board has been reprinted in numerous publications. See Hughes,
supra note 26 at 450.
51 Hasluck, supra note 23 at 144.
52 "Aborigines and the Law", supra note 19 at 47.
53 Neal, supra note 18 at c. 3 and 4.
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Myall Creek trials (and hangings) prove that the legal authorities had the capacity to
effectively prosecute frontier killings of Aborigines by whites. There, convict squatters
sworn to a conspiracy of silence were turned on each otherby the relentless examination
of a competent magistrate.5 4 Rather, it seems that the explanation of H.V. Evatt that,
absent any political framework for the articulation of the settler's views, the courts
becametheironly arenaofresistanceto autocratic colonial government.5 Thenullification
of criminal prosecutions was one form ofobjection to the lack of effective governmental
protection of the squatters interests in an ever expanding pastoral frontier. This is not
merely an inference drawn from such a high level of legal inaction. The Hawkesbury
killings led to a specific exchange about government policy, balancing the need for
strong law enforcementto structure frontierviolence, against a legal culture that excused
such violence as due to "extenuating circumstances". The policy of vigorous criminal
prosecution to structure frontier violence was directly presented to the Colonial Office.
It was rejected in a context where the level ofuncontrolled frontier violence was known
to be very high, a fact indicated repeatedly in the dispatches.
B. The Legal Control ofAboriginal Violence Against Whites
Different legal issues emerge from the extension of British law to Aborigine
violence against whites. While there is no question that British settlers and convicts
brought an awareness of British law with them, it was conceded by all parties that
Aborigines had no knowledge of British law, and also that Aborigines had their own
legal norms, very different from white laws. Together, these issues raised difficult legal
problems in the prosecution of Aborigines for offenses against whites.
The earliest state violence officially directed against Aborigines was in the form of
terror-ridden retaliatory attacks, ordered by Governor Phillip within the first year of the
founding of the colony. Not only were troops ordered to open fire indiscriminately
against Aborigines forpunitive purposes, unconnected to the apprehension ofindividual
offenders, butPhillip sent out retaliatory expeditions that he equipped with headbaskets,
ordering the killing often Aborigines for every white. 6 Just as killings of natives in the
United States and Canada were political acts, beyondthe scope oflegal authorities, these
actions were extra-legal, beyond even the law of martial law.17
Deputy Judge Advocate Atkins (who had convicted the Hawkesbury defendants,
then favoured reserving sentencing until an inquiry could be forwarded to colonial
authorities) was officially requested to issue a legal opinion on the status of Aborigines
in the Hawkesbury violence. Atkins' memo is a bizarre mixture of law and policy.
Concluding that Aborigines were within the "pale" of British law, he raised clear issues
- Milliss, supra note 42 at c. 11 "An Inquiry on the Big River" at 322-7 1.
5- H.V. Evatt, Rum Rebellion (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1955).
56 Frontier, supra note 3 at 33-35. These killings of course were the basis for the defense of the
Hawkesbury killers. W.E.H. Stanner, "The History of Indifference Thus Begins" (1977) 1 Aboriginal
History 3 and J. Miller, Koori: A Will to Win (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1985) at 15-41 present an
idea of what this process might have looked like from the standpoint of Aboriginal custom.
57 The hundred or more Indian Wars in the US were similarly anomalous: they were never
declared "wars" by Act of Congress, as the Constitution requires, but were held military actions,
beyond the scope of the courts. Thus, they were not subject to either the law of warfare or civil law.




of criminal responsibility that made it impossible to try Aborigines. How could a native
plead to an indictment with no idea of its meaning? How could they give evidence?"
Atkins then went into a defense of the Hawkesbury River settlers, continuously
subjected to the depredations of Aborigines, against whom "lenient measures" had
failed. Arguing that it would make a "mocking ofjudicial proceedings" to criminally
prosecute natives, Atkins held that "the only mode at present, when they deserve it, is
to pursue and inflict such punishment as they may merit". 9 In effect, this meant lawless
retaliation, not even martial law, for military law had rules. This, of course, is precisely
what Australian settlers did for more than a hundred years, eventually killing perhaps
20,000 natives.
Atkins' opinion, as clear as it is, can be read in several ways. It is "his opinion" and
neverhadbinding legal force. No Governor everexpressly adoptedit, andthe documents
clearly state the opposite: thatmassive retaliation against tribes ofAborigines was illegal
and should not be employed." Atkins' opinion, on its narrowest foundation, was
intended to justify a legal stand that he and other military officers had personally taken
in the Hawkesbury trials, a stand that had put him against the Governor. On broader
grounds, there is considerable inferential evidence to suggest that the Governor's
repeated documents refusing to sanction such a policy of general retaliation were for
official consumption by the Colonial Office, trying to straddle a fine line between the
legal niceties expected by British officials and the political demands of frontier settlers.6 1
The idea that some form of military law was appropriate in such situations clearly
was present in Australia through the first half of the nineteenth century. The Coorong
Massacre of 1840 involved this issue, with Judge Charles Cooper ofthe South Australian
Supreme Court ruling that British law did not apply to "wild and savage tribes" whose
lands had never been occupied by settlers. In that case, twenty-six passengers on an
Australian ship were killed by Aborigines after being shipwrecked on the coast ofSouth
Australia. Although within the jurisdictional limits of the colony, the tribe in question
had no known relationship with Australian authority, and thus acted without any
knowledge whatever of Australian law. From the standpoint of the criminal law, the
authorities had no way to bring formal charges against any members of the tribe in
question, fornone of the formal requirements ofproof could be met. There was no legal
action that could be taken.6 2
Members of the Milmenrura tribe were rounded up for questioning and articles
taken from the ship were found. Through interpreters a short "trial" was held, conducted
by the police without regard to the formalities of British law, although evidence was
taken. Two Aborigines were sentenced to hang. A crude gallows was constructed the
next day, and the hangings took place. The hangings were botched, with the drop failing
5 H.R.A., supra note 28 at 503.
59 Ibid. at 504.
60 Ibid.
61 Frontier, supra note 3. Reynolds is most consistent and convincing on this point. There were
simply too many retaliatory killings, over too wide a front, without official reaction, to be consistent
with an official policy of preventing them. Even the Myall Creek trials are not inconsistent with this.
Rather, they may simply reflect an official response to what was viewed as widely excessive frontier
violence, unjustified under any circumstances.
62 S.D. Lendrum, "The 'Coorong Massacre': Martial Law and the Aborigines atFirst Settlement"
(1977) 6 Adelaide L. Rev. 26.
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to break the necks of the prisoners, who suffered terribly until a sailor re-hoisted them
and dropped them again. The Commissioner of Police, Major O'Halloran, then made a
speech to the remaining Aborigines on their need to respect English law, and the tribe
was allowed to leave.
63
The public discussion of the event led to sharp criticism of the hangings, as well as
attempts at a defense of their legality. The South Australian Register thought the
hangings illegal, although morally justified on a self-defense theory.64 Advocate-
General Smillie, chief legal officer of the colony, argued the actions were legal on two
theories. First, that the Aborigines were not British subjects, therefore not entitled to a
British trial; second, the tribe was a separate nation attacking a British colony, thereby
the colony was entitled to protect itself under international law, a proposition for which
Smillie cited Vattel.65
The idea that the Aborigines of South Australia were British subjects, thus entitled
to the full protection of British law, was not an abstract statement ofmoral principle, but
was fundamental to the founding principles of the colony. Upon settlement in 1836, the
government had proclaimed Aborigines in the colony to be British subjects. Still, the
meaning of this action was disputed: did it refer to all Aborigines anywhere within the
boundaries of the colony, or only Aborigines who had been brought into contact with
whites? This was a parallel argument to that raised by the cases involving interse crimes
among Aborigines.
The idea ofimartial law inthis case raisedmore questions thanit answered, but seems
to have been beyond the legal power of the Governor. Martial law might permit limited
military government of a civilian population, but not the execution of civilians in
military custody. Military action, a distinct legal process from martial law, might permit
the killing of combatants, but again, not of prisoners in military custody.66 The matter
was settled conclusively when the Colonial Office sought a legal opinion on the matter
from the Law Officers of the Crown. The summary execution of the Aborigines was
contrary to law. Rather, they should have been brought to trial in the ordinary legal
tribunals of South Australia.67
In additionto extra-legal punishment ofnatives, as early as the 1820s therewere also
occasional trials of Aborigines under British criminal law for offenses against whites.
There was no specific legal authorization for such trials. Rather, colonial officials,
generally attorney generals and judges, simply decided that colonial courts had criminal
jurisdiction over natives,just as they hadjurisdiction over all otherpersons in the colony.
Bob Barrett was tried in Sydney in 1829, and transported for murder.68 Musquito was
tried for murder in Sydney in the early 1820s, transported to Tasmania, where he broke
63 Ibid. at 27-28.
64 The idea that an act might be illegal, though morally justified, stems from the jurisprudence
of natural law. Colonists everywhere in the English speaking world often used natural law arguments
when British law was opposed to local interests.
65 Lendrum, supra note 62 at 28-30. E. de Vattel, The Law ofNations or Principles of Natural
Law, first published in 1758, was the nineteenth century's most cited treatise in international law.
6 Lendrum, ibid. at 36-42.
67 Ibid. at 42-43.
68 Unreported case, briefly discussed in J. McCorquodale, Aborigines and the Law: A Digest
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1987) at 373.
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away from his captors, fled to the bush, and led Aborigines in raids on whites. He was
captured, tried again, and hanged in 1826.69
The elimination of any options of extra-legal punishment of Aborigines, or of any
special legal process including military process, still left serious legal questions as well
as practical questions of evidence. These issues involved difficulties, but problems that
were not insurmountable as evidenced by the regular prosecution of Aborigines in
Australian courts after the 1840s. For example, of twenty-six murder trials heard in the
Melbourne Supreme Court between 1841 and September of 1851, seven involved
Aborigine defendants, charged with killing whites in five cases and fellow Aborigines
in two. Five defendants charged in three of these cases were executed. Three defendants
in two cases were discharged, under the common law rule that they were unable to
understand the proceedings against them, thus unable to defend themselves. Two were
found not guilty; one was convicted but transported.70 Similar data exist for Sydney: of
forty-four Aborigines committed for trial for murder before 1855, twenty-eight were
convicted and seventeen of those executed, a slightly higher conviction and execution
rate than Port Phillip but a difference that is based on so few cases that no meaning can
be generalized from it.7' Comparable data for South Australia reveal a consistentpattern:
twenty Aborigines were executed for murdering whites before 1900, twenty Aborigines
had their death sentences for murder commuted during the same period.72 These data
indicate that the common law criminal trial process was operating in relationship to
Aborigines by the 1840s, leading to acquittals (or at least the absence of a criminal
conviction) in half of all capital cases, a lower conviction rate than one now finds in
Australia.73
But this is only half of the story. Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia
also hanged a large number ofAborigines for crimes against whites as part ofa deliberate
strategy of terror, designedto use the horror ofthe gallows to both deter Aborigines from
committing crimes against whites, and also, to convince frontier whites that colonial
officials were prepared to use the death penalty to protect the settler's interests. This was
an unsatisfactory legal process because the colonial authorities were not able to control
frontier violence until the twentieth century.
C. Prosecution ofInter Se Offenses Between Aborigines
Once the theoretical idea that Australian natives were British subjects, fully under
British law, was developed in cases of native/white violence, the principle logically
included inter se offenses, "crimes" as defined by British law, occurring between
Aborigines. This logic aside, the principle did not follow without some difficulty. Much
of this difficulty has been approached on the level of administration: simple problems
69 Levy, supra note 50 at 101.
70 S. Davies, "Aborigines, Murder, and the Criminal Law in Early Port Phillip, 1841-1851"
(1987) 22 Historical Studies 313 at 333-35.
71 "Aborigines and the Law", supra note 19 at 47.
72 A.R.G. Griffiths, "Capital Punishment in South Australia, 1836-1964" (1970) 3 Australian &
New Zealand J. of Criminology 214.
73 Conviction rates in western societies now routinely run above 90%, higher than in the
nineteenth century, because of a higher level of professionalization in the law enforcement apparatus
and the bureaucratization of the criminal trial process.
1994]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
of proof when Aborigines either would not nor did not give evidence. There was a
broader theoretical issue here, recognized in 1830s Australian law: such an imposition
of British law both (1) interfered with the operation of tribal law and internal tribal
affairs, an arena many colonial officials did not want to enter or did so with great
reluctance; and (2) posed unique administrative and legal difficulties that might not be
worth the cost. In these cases British law first legally came to terms with tribal
sovereignty and Aboriginal self-government.
The first cases are well-known and in conflict. A Sydney case, R. v. Congo Jack
Murrell,74 and a Port Phillip case, R. v. Bon Jon75 were in conflict on the law, a difference
not resolved until the 1840s. This conflict shows that two sets of legal theories on the
question of Aboriginal criminal responsibility were competing in Australia in the 1840s.
Congo Jack Murrell was charged in December 1835 with killing Definger in a
drunken rage.76 Along with a companion case, Murrell was set for trial before Chief
Justice Frances Forbes and Justices Dowling and Burton in February, 1836.71 While
Aboriginal sovereignty had doubtlessly been argued before as a defense in New South
Wales courts, it had never been argued with so much preparation, before three judges
in a highly publicized case, recognized as a test case by all involved.
78
Congo JackMurrell is not remarkable as legal doctrine. The two page opinion ends
with a straightforward holding that there is no distinction between offenses between
Aborigines and those between Aborigines and whites, which, the court stated, was
answerable under British law according to "all hands".79 Beneath this simple holding
there were more complex issues of Aboriginal sovereignty that concerned the court,
issues thatwere open legal questions atthe time. Both sides argued issues ofinternational
law, inherently attributing some measure of national sovereignty to native people.
Alfred Stephen, for the defense, attacked the terra nullius theory of British occupation
of Australia, arguing that it was a conquered land and, accordingly, local law applied to
its inhabitants until it was specifically replaced." In addition, another argument
stemmed from the conflict of laws. It was undisputed that Murrell was still subject to
Aboriginal law, no matter what the British court held. Accordingly, he was subject to
being tried twice for the same offense, with double jeopardy an obvious injustice
incompatible with the common law." This issue squarely put both the existence and
vitality of Aboriginal law before the court.
The court's holding directly addressed Aboriginal sovereignty, equivocating in a
pragmatic way, rather than neatly defining a legal resolution of the issue. For Justice
74 (1836) 1 Legge 72 [hereinafter Murrell].
75 This case is unreported, but the decision is published in detail in the Port Phillip Patriot,
September 20, 1841.
76 "The Extension of English Law", supra note 19. Bridges, for reasons that are unclear, gives
the victim as Bill Jabenguy (at 264). I have followed the official report of the case.
77 Ibid. The case is only briefly discussed in Forbes' otherwise detailed biography, C.H. Currey,
Sir Frances Forbes (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1968) at 470-71.
78 Ibid. at 268-69. In an unreported 1826 case involving an Aborigine charged with attempted
murder of a white man in the Hunter Valley, the court decided that Aborigines were not amenable to
British law. This case is anomalous: Australian courts clearly held the other way, and had tried and
executed Aborigines for murder of whites.
79 Murrell, supra note 74 at 73.
80 "Extension of English Law", supra note 19 at 264-65.
11 Ibid. at 265.
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Burton, "although it might be granted that on the first taking possession of the Colony,
the [A]borigines were entitled to be recognized as free and independent, yet they were
not in such a position with regard to strength as to be considered free and independent
tribes. They had no sovereignty."8 2 These two sentences, the first sentences of the
holding, are internally inconsistent: ifAborigines were "entitledto be recognized as free
and independent" what difference did their strength make? The Court's holding adopts
a relativistic view of tribal societies that distinguishes Aborigines from Indians in North
America: the difference between the "free and independent" status of Aborigines "on
possession of the Colony" and the position of"no sovereignty" in 1836 is nothing less
than "they were not in such a position with regard to strength as to be considered free
and independent tribes." In order to have any right to tribal sovereignty, the Aboriginal
tribes needed to be stronger. However, the opinion was premised on the idea of tribal
sovereignty holding that, at least at some prior time in Australian colonial history, "the
[A]borigines were entitled to be recognized as free and independent",.
3
The last part of the court's holding (its clauses conveniently numbered 1 through
5) goes a long way toward explaining this conditional view of Aboriginal sovereignty.
The court interjects a straightforward policy analysis: "Serious causes might arise if
these people were allowed to murder one another with impunity, our laws would be no
sanctuary to them. ' '8 4 This statement has nothing to do with either British law or tribal
sovereignty. Rather, it is an obvious policyjudgment, yet still begs the original question
of tribal sovereignty. General language in the same paragraph that "the court could see
no difference" between this offense and one committed on a white avoids the same
question: the difference was tribal sovereignty, an issue raisedby Murrell's attorney, and
recognized by the court, at least as an issue, in its own discussion of tribal sovereignty
at the beginning of the opinion.
This language does not prove that Aborigines are entitled to recognition of their
sovereignty through a reinterpretation ofthe Murrell case. Rather, itproves thatthe issue
of Aboriginal sovereignty and the recognition of Aboriginal law were a part of the
discourse of Aboriginal status of 1830s and 1840s Australia. The court's brushing off
of these issues in relation to criminal jurisdiction was consistent with British practice
everywhere in its early nineteenth century colonies, probably influenced by its disregard
of the tribal laws of Canadian Indians in parallel homicide cases in the Canadian
colonies. 5 In the end, the case went nowhere. The Colony could not carry its burden of
proof in Murrell, leading to a "not guilty" verdict. 86
82 Murrell, supra note 74 at 73.
83 Castles, supra note 15 at 528 argues, citing Bridges, thatMurrellis a more uncertain case than
it is commonly cited as.
m Murrell, supra note 74 at 73.
85 S.L. Harring, "The Liberal Treatment ofIndians: Native People in Nineteenth Century Ontario
Law" (1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 297.
16 The charges in Bummary, subject to similar problems, were dropped. Two years later the first
Aborigine was convictedunderthe general holding ofMurrell. Long Jackwas convicted, also by Judge
Burton, of killing his wife Mary, in a drunken stupor. Burton convicted Jack, but recommended
transportation for life as a means of reconciling the harsh demands of colonial law with the reality of
serious jurisdictional and moral problems of holding natives accountable for crimes under British
justice.
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A British House of Commons report, tabled on June 26, 1837, responded to these
same legal issues, and clearly was influenced by the Murrell case.87 The thrust of this
report recognized both the integrity of customary law, and also the practical necessity
of permitting it to continue functioning under British protection. The report then
equivocated on this position fortwo reasons. First, the Report was concerned that British
law not sanction "barbarous" native actions. Second, the impact on colonial settlers of
any appearance that natives were beyond the pale ofBritish law, was noted. It could only
bring one consequence: forcing settlers to abandonthe law and adopt other means ofself-
defense.88
There is no easy way out of this dilemma; it follows from colonialism, from the
destruction of the customary legal orders of native people. Ultimately, the Report
recommended making individual treaties with "the independent tribes" defining "what
acts should be considered as penal, by whatpenalties they should be visited, and in what
form of procedure those penalties should be enforced."89 This recommendation is
remarkable: it recognizes a substantial measure of sovereignty in native tribes, and
directly puts the matter of both the substantive criminal law and procedure up for
negotiating in a treaty-making process. This clearly meant that British criminal law and
procedure didnot automatically apply to native people in the colonies, butrequired some
additional political process involving native people as political actors.
This was not yet the end ofthe issue. Bon Jon was charged with killing YamerWeen
in Geelong in 1841. Charged before Justice John W. Willis in the Supreme Court in
Melbourne, Willis refused to followMurrell, setting the whole issue for argument.9" The
sovereignty issues of Murrell were reargued, but with more emphasis on the fact that
Aborigines had their own laws, as well as the view that no express law applied British
law to natives. Willis took a more pragmatic position than Burton, holding that while
Aborigines might be British subjects for some purposes, no express law extended
criminal jurisdiction to Aborigines. He also was concerned with the jurisdictional void
being created in not recognizing Aboriginal law, while at the same time British law could
not effectively reach native tribes. Inthe end he disposed ofthe case on a simple common
law basis related to his general views. Willis held that Bon Jon was unable to appreciate
the charge against him, or was of insufficient intelligence to plead, and therefore
discharged him without trial.9
While Judge Willis wanted the matter referred to the Colonial Office or to British
officials for a legal opinion, Governor Gipps referred the matter only to Chief Justice
'7 "Select Committee", supra note 30 reprinted in "Aborigines of Port Phillip, 1835-1839"
Historical Records of Victoria, vol. 2A (Melbourne: Government Printing Office, 1982) 61 at 65-66
[hereinafter H.R. V]. There is no direct evidence that this committee knew of the Murrell case, but it
may be reasonably inferred from the fact that destruction of Aborigines in Australia was the primary
motivation for the creation of the Committee, although disturbing events in other colonies were also
at issue. Assuming this interest in Australia, any close following of legal events relating to Aborigines
during 1835 and 1836 would have focused attention on theMurrell case, which was decided while the
Committee was in session, but sixteen months before the Committee stopped taking evidence.
88 Ibid. at 65.
19 Ibid. at 66.
90 "Extension ofEnglish Law", supra note 19 at 267. Judge Willis undoubtedly was aware ofthe
House ofCommons Committee Report, perhaps taking it as an incentive to attempt ajudicial reframing




Dowling. Dowling, not unexpectedly, took the position that there was no issue because
the matter was stare decisis, having already been decided by a full three judge panel in
Murrell.92 As a jurisdictional issue, the question of Aboriginal sovereignty, the tribes
right to their own laws, went no further. In the end, however, Willis was right: British
law was incapable ofintervening in native customary life, yet Aboriginal customary law
was underminedby these rulings. Bon Jon returned to his own people and was killed for
reasons unknown. It was quite possibly a legal execution under tribal law, punishment
for his killing of Yamer Ween. 93 South Australia appears to have deferred to Willis'
reasoning, apparently dismissing several charges against Aborigines for inter se crimes
in the 1840s and 1850s.94 It was 1873 before an Aborigine was convicted of killing
another native there.95
IV. THE ABORIGINE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AUSTRALIAN LAW
Congo Jack Murrell and Bon Jon did not resolve the problems of denying native
sovereignty and holding Aborigines fully accountable, as British subjects, under
Australian law. It took thirty-two nineteenth century cases to deal with the broad range
of complicated legal questions left unanswered.96 These thirty-two reported cases, in
turn, distort the reality of the reach of Australian law in two ways. First, relatively few
cases involving Aborigines made it to the courts. Second, virtually all of the reported
cases, twenty-eight out of thirty-two, are criminal cases, indicating both that the
participation ofAborigines in Australian society as "British subjects" was a legal fiction,
completely without legal effect, and also that this participation was structured by
uncontrolled violence. This is the primary problem in the twentieth century Australian
legal history of native people and their rights.
A. Criminal Cases
Murrell and Bon Jon communicate an active judiciary, capable of engaging in a
dynamic legal dialogue about Aboriginal rights. This, together with the political
dialogue of Aboriginal rights that was on-going in Parliament and in the New South
Wales government under Governor Gipps, shows that there was a foundation for the
creation ofa substantial system ofnative rights in Australia in the 1840s. The cases which
followed failed to develop such rights.
The cases following Murrell and Bon Jon involve the court's tentative attempts to
apply the doctrine of Murrell to the range ofnative criminal cases brought before them,
mostly homicide cases. There were two lines of legal debate. Ittook twenty years before
lawyers stopped raising the issue that Aborigines were a sovereign people and therefore
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid. Behan, supra note 4, the only biography of Willis, discusses this case at 95-96.
94 Castles, supra note 15 at 33 1.
95 Griffiths, supra note 72 at 220.
96 McCorquodalesupra note 68 at225 lists thirty nineteenth century cases involving Aborigines
ortheir rights. While most ofthese cases are reported, a fewpre-existedthe reporting systems andwere
taken from newspapers or government documents. I rechecked the official reporters for all Australian
reporters and found McCorquodale's listing complete, except for two reported Queensland cases,
which I added to the list, making thirty-two reported cases. Obviously, there were hundreds of
unreported criminal cases: one for every criminal charge brought against an Aborigine.
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not subject to British law. A number of challenges were made to the basic holding of
Murrell, still arguing that Aborigines were subject to their own laws, not to the laws of
colonial Australia. For example, inR. v. Peter, decided in Victoria in 1860, twenty-four
years after Murrell, a half-caste Aborigine argued that he was amenable to customary
law and not British law. The court simply restated Murrell.97 Three months later, in R.
v. Jemmy another Aborigine, charged with manslaughter for killing a woman, argued
that neither had "become civilized" or "had changed their habits and modes of life" to
have voluntarily subjected themselves to colonial law.98
The second line of debate turned not over the question of British jurisdiction over
Aborigines, but over the injustice of its full application: strict application of British
principles obviously led to manifest injustice when Aborigines had no idea of British
law, nor comprehended British criminal procedure. This had been Judge Willis'
disposition of Bon Jon's murder charge, dismissed because Bon Jon had no idea of the
proceedings against him, and no capacity to participate in his defense, a traditional
common law defense. Few otherAboriginal defendants fared so well. Like Murrellmost
of the defendants were given sentences of transportation, rather than the death penalty.
Jacky Jacky was transported to Norfolk Island for the murder of another Aborigine,
Tommy, in 1844.11
While short terms of transportation might be moderate sentences for homicides,
they were also imposed for property offenses. The judges knew, however, that these
sentences were the equivalent of death sentences. Yanem Goora was sentenced in 1845
in Port Phillip to ten years transportation for killing sheep. After surviving two years on
Norfolk Island, he was transferred to Tasmania where he died.' Kunnim Kooruba
Kowan received seven years transportation for housebreaking and presenting a loaded
firearm, also dying in captivity.'0'
Legal questions relating to evidentiary matters were second to questions of native
jurisdiction in this thirty year legal debate overthe scope of British law over Aboriginal
people. This judicial effort is important because it is the only area of Aboriginal law that
was both a legislative and judicial concern in the nineteenth century: legislative efforts
to admit Aboriginal evidence paralleled judicial efforts to strike a reasonable
accommodationto securethe evidence ofAborigines, who were oftenthe only witnesses
to crime. In contrast to legislative refusal to pass laws to admit Aboriginal evidence,
judges went to great lengths to do so, perhaps the clearest area ofjudicial creativity in
Aboriginal law after Willis' refusal to extend British law to Aborigines.
Although the law was well settledthatno one could give evidence in a British court
but upon oath unless he believed in a future state ofpunishment and reward, this rule left
a great deal to local courts as questions of fact, to be put to the witnesses.0 2 Courts were
prepared to follow this rule, even to the extent of quashing the conviction of Paddy, a
convicted murderer. 03 Courts were often willing to interpret the facts in such a way that
97 Briefly reported in ibid. at 427.
98 Ibid. at 4 1. In all, seven out ofthirty-two reported nineteenth century cases concerned matters
of British jurisdiction over Aboriginal people.
99 Ibid. at 399. Unreported case of the Supreme Court Criminal Sessions, Port Phillip, 1844.
100 Ibid. at 446.101 Ibid. at 408.
102 Ochimund v. Barker (1744) Willes 538 [hereinafter Ochimund].
103 The Queen v. Paddy (1876) 14 S.C.R. (N.S.W) (L.) 440 [hereinafter Paddy].
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concluded individual Aborigines did have such a fear of punishment in the afterlife, and
thereby admit the evidence. In R. v. Smith the trial judge interrogated an Aboriginal boy
of fifteen or sixteen years, who, although he spoke English, had no formal schooling or
religious training whatever. The boy spoke in very general terms about having heard of
hell and of being punished there if bad, and thejudge held that he was competent to take
an oath. On appeal, the resulting conviction for cattle stealing was affirmed.' In all, of
five criminal convictions raising issues of the inadmissibility of Aboriginal evidence,
four were upheld, indicating that courts were more reluctant than the legislature to let
evidentiary issues stand in the way of criminal convictions. This also reflects the reality
of Aboriginal trials: local magistrates, knowing appeals of native convictions unlikely,
simply relaxed the rules of evidence to permit the conviction of natives on illegal
evidence.
Basic procedural protections afforded criminal defendants are the source of only a
handful ofAboriginal criminal appeals, although,judging from the state of local justice
for Aborigines in general, violations of procedural due process must have been very
frequent. Nammy, a Northern Territory Aborigine sentenced to death for the murder of
Harry Hanschildt in the Daley River killings, had his conviction reversed on the grounds
of double jeopardy."5 In the Territory's haste to prosecute Aboriginal killers, they had
prosecuted Nammy in a magistrate's court that lacked jurisdiction in capital cases. In
response to Nammy's defense of double-jeopardy when he was re-tried for the same
murder, the Crown argued that, since the first court lacked jurisdiction, it had not been
a legal trial, therefore Nammy was never in jeopardy twice.'0 6
Nammy was the only native whose reported conviction was reversed on procedural
grounds. InR. v. Many, Many and Others, six Pacific Islanders were interrogatedwithout
caution, each making incriminating statements." 7 The court held that such cautions were
unnecessary as long as the statements were made without threats or promises. 8 Jack,
a Queensland Aboriginal convicted of attempted rape, argued that his conviction was
procedurally defective because no prosecution had been commenced within two months
of the offense as prescribed by statute. 19 The court held, somewhat incredibly, that the
term "prosecution" was not a "term of art with a technical meaning" but could be taken
simply to mean Jack's initial arrest, which had occurred within the two month limit,
although he was not charged until much later. This interpretation of the law, especially
in view ofJack's protestation that the officer had not even informed him ofwhat charges
would be brought againsthim, is notconsistent with the common law rule requiring strict
construction of a penal statute.10
Two other cases involved substantive criminal law and the application of common
law principles to Aboriginal criminal responsibility. In The Queen v. Black Bob two
Aborigines attempted to have sexual intercourse with a white woman, but stopped
without engaging in the act, at least in part due to her resistance." Their defense, one
1- (1872) 11 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) (L.) 69.
105 R. v. Nammy OthertviseJacky (1886) 20 S.A.L.R. 65.
,o6 Ibid. at 67-73.
,O7 R. v. Many, Many and Others (1895) 6 Q.L.J. 224.
103 Ibid. at 226.
'1 R. v. Jack (1894) 6 Q.L.J. 60.
"10 Ibid. at 62.
"' (1867) 7 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) (L.) 120.
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of abandoning their criminal purpose, was rejected by both the jury and the appellate
court. Queen v. Charlie Combo raised exactly the same issue, but on much more benign
facts.' 2 Combo, wearing only a shirt, had crawled into bed beside a white woman
sleeping on her verandah on a hot night. Feeling a hand on her bare right shoulder, she
awoke, found Combo, and screamed. He ran off into the night, but was found lying
behind a log. On these facts, Combo was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to
ravish. The conviction was reversed on appeal. Although Combo had no representation,
the Crown conceded that the conviction could not be supported on this evidence. The
court agreed, finding that no mens rea whatever had been established.
113
These two cases cannot stand much generalization, but several issues stand out.
First, like homicide, a large number of sexual attacks led to only two appeals. This
indicates that Aboriginal defendants did not often bring appeals. At the same time, both
the actions of the court and the prosecutor in Charlie Combo, in a context where the
accused had no representation, can only indicate that some sense of fairness prevailed:
it would have been a simple matter to uphold the conviction on the ground that the jury
hadproperly inferred criminal mens rea from Combo's action. This is perhaps especially
important given the symbolic meaning of black sexual attacks on white women, a
sensational issue in colonial societies. 1 4 Combo, in fact, is one of only two reported
reversals of Aboriginal criminal convictions in nineteenth century Australia, and the
only one involving a white victim."'
B. Civil Cases
The relative absence of civil cases involving Aboriginals is among the clearest
statements ofAborigine citizens' lack ofaccess to Australian law, andproofofthe failure
of Australian law to address the needs ofAborigines. While criminal law was in the hands
ofthe state, civil law was in the hands ofprivate individuals, who could choose whether
a particular matter was worth pursuing at law or not. The fact that virtually everyone
involved, black orwhite, chose not to botherto use the law in these matters speaks to the
nature of law in structuring civil relationships between Aborigines and whites: it was
irrelevant.
Perhaps the clearest civil case that shows this is the leading case on the legality of
Aboriginal marriages, R. v. Cobby."6 Atthe outset, thefactthatthe legality ofAboriginal
marriages was not judicially decided until late in the nineteenth century itself speaks to
the legal irrelevancy of the matter. Even then, the matter arose in a criminal case, when
an Aborigine charged with manslaughter tried to exclude the evidence of a woman on
the groundthat she washis wife. The trial court, withno precedent on the matter, deferred
the question to the appellate court. The Supreme Court of New South Wales was
112 (1877) 1 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) (L.) 91.
11 1bid. at 92.
"I C. Harris, "The Terror ofthe Law as Applied to Black Rapists in Colonial Queensland" (1982)
8 Hecate 22. R. Barber, "Rape as a Capital Offence in Nineteenth Century Queensland" (1975) 21
Australian J. of Pol. & Hist. 31.
115 This is based on my own count of the cases reported in McCorquodale, supra note 68. The
other reversal is the murder conviction of Paddy, accused of killing an Aborigine. See Paddy, supra
note 103 at 440.
116 (1883) 4 N.S.W.L.R. (L.) 355.
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dismissive. Starting from a common law rule thatrecognized customary marriages based
on local traditions in different parts of the Empire, the Court refused to extend that
principle to Aborigines:
But to extend that law to the aborigines of this colony, or to take the statement of
their customs from one ofthemselves, is to go too far. We may recognize a marriage
in a civilized country, but we can hardly do the same in the case of the marriages of
these aborigines, who have no laws of which we can take cognizance."
7
This ruling is completely devoid of reasoning: as long as Aborigines are not civilized
people, British law cannot apply. Itis unique to the common law world: native customary
marriages were legally recognized everywhere else under the common law."8
In exparte West a writ of habeas corpus was issued against a squatter to produce
Tommy, an Aboriginal boy, in court." 9 The writwas issued on the application ofanother
white settler, who had heard the man say that he had stolen the boy from his tribe. In his
return ofthe writ Alexander Collins, holder of the boy, claimed that he held the boy with
the consent of his natural father. Producing the boy in court, Collins refused to give
further explanation, or to answer questions of the court, on the advice of counsel. The
court not only turned the boy over to the custody of the Colonial Secretary, but used
strong language to rebuke the conduct of Collins:
It was a moral wrong- an outrage-an act ofgross cruelty which no man ofcommon
feeling could hear described without an expression of strong indignation...These
people were British subjects, and if held responsible for crime on the one band,
should be protected from outrage on the other. 20
The courtwent onto point outthat a cycle ofvengeance andretaliation could be expected
to follow such actions. Collins was apparently notprosecuted for kidnapping andperjury
in making his false return. It is not clear what the Colonial Secretary ultimately did with
the boy.
C. Aboriginal Right to their Land
The case law is not dispositive on issues of Aboriginal title to land. Three reported
nineteenth century cases deal with land rights in general. Yet, these cases are not, within
any stretch of the imagination, Aboriginal cases, for no Aboriginal people were parties,
and the direct question of Aboriginal land rights was never before the court. M'Hugh v.
Robertson is illustrative of cases of this type.' The issue involved a challenge to a
Sunday closing law. British law presumably applied if the law was reasonably capable
117 Ibid. at 356.
"I For example, the two Canadian cases on the legality of Indian customary law both involved
white marriages to Indians under tribal law. The courts conceded that such marriages between Indians
were obviously legal. Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 11 L.C.Jur. 197 (S.R.); Robb v. Robb (1891), 20
O.R. 591 (Common Pleas Div.). For a discussion of this issue see C. Backhouse, Petticoats and
Prejudice: Women and the Law in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: Women's Press, 1991) at 9.
119 (1861) 2 Legge 1475.
120 Ibid. at 1476.
121 (1885) 11 V.L.R. 410.
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of being applied in New South Wales in 1828, a simple test for the general reception of
British law in Australia. In order for the court to determine whether this law was, in fact,
capable of application, it had to carefully examine the circumstances of the colony in
1828. Judge Holyroyd, of the Supreme Court of Victoria, stated that in conducting this
examination, Aboriginal inhabitants were "altogether put out of mind" as British
authorities treated Australia as an uninhabited desert country.12
Cooper v. Stuartdealtwith a question ofthe rule againstperpetuities inAustralia.123
It held that, since Australia was an uninhabited country, all English laws were therefore
in force, but did not directly rule on any question of Aboriginal title. Only Attorney
General v. Brown specifically holds that "the waste lands ofthis colony" are the property
of the Crown, a direct statement of Crown ownership of the land, but not without
qualification.' 24 Thus, Australian judges never directly passed on the question of
Aboriginal land tenure. Among the reasons for this included the fact that Aborigines, in
spite of being juridical British citizens, did not become legal actors within the colonial
legal framework.
The jurisprudence of Australian judges, like colonial judges generally, was
conservative. The reported cases show competent judicial work, including some
willingness to intervene on behalf of Aboriginal defendants. Lacking is any sense of
judicial initiative to protect native rights, an initiative running through to Mabo in
Australian law.
V. THE ADMISSION OF ABORIGINAL EVIDENCE
A major legal issue concerning native people in nineteenth century Australia is the
admission of Aboriginal testimony in court. This question raises a number of practical
and theoretical considerations, involving trials, legal magistrates and judges, appellate
courts, the legislature, and the Colonial Office. Not only were the rights of Aboriginals
as citizens at stake, but also was the capacity of local government to try cases where
Aboriginals were witnesses, whether against whites or Aboriginals. So, a wide variety
of issues and interests were tied up in the narrow question of the admissibility of
Aboriginal testimony in Australian courts. 2 ' As important as this issue was, it was
beyond the scope of the formal workings of Australian law making; all measures to
permit the admission of Aboriginal evidence were rejected in New South Wales until
1876, and then only after the issue became the admission of the evidence of atheists.
Given that Aborigines became British citizens with settlement, it should have
followed that their testimony would automatically have been accepted in British courts.
In the way, however, was a racist and ethnocentric 1744 Indian case, Ochimund v.
Barker, holding that "nothing but a belief in God and that he will reward and punish us
according to our deserts is necessary to qualify a man to take the oath....Infidels cannot
be a witness." 2 6 Although Aborigines were British citizens, they needed to have some
recognized belief in a particular kind of god; only a god who would reward and punish.
In Ibid.
I- (1889) 10 N.S.W.L.R. (Eq.) 173.
124 (1847) 1 Legge 312 [hereinafter Brown].
12 D. Kotthoff, The History of the Admission of Aboriginal-Evidence into the Courts of New
South Wales, 1788-1876 (LL.B. Thesis, Australian National University, 1974).
M26 Ochimund, supra note 102 at 549.
[Vol. 26:2
The Killing Time
Without much inquiry, Australian courts held that Aboriginal religion was not adequate
to this test, although some non-Christian religious belief was. 27
Beyond this was a much more pragmatic problem; with so many Aboriginal
languages and dialects, it could be all but impossible to find an interpreter. 28 The
implications of this fact went well beyond the simple provision of testimony; it made
Aborigines untriable in British courts because they could not understand the proceedings
against them and provide any defense) 29
As early as the 1820s colonial officials were urging legal measures to reform this
unjust situation. The primary impetus behind this was as much the practical needs of
procuring convictions in ordinary criminal cases as it was the belief that Aborigines
needed to be equally treated in Australian courts, but issues of both law and humanity
were involved. The colonial dispatches of the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s contain dozens
of references to the need for legal measures to secure the admission of Aboriginal
evidence. Thesemeasures accompanythe earliest application ofBritish lawto Aborigines.
Any person aware of the practical significance of the extension of colonial law to
Aborigines knew that this juridical equality was a farce in practice: evidence became
symbolic of the entire problem; if an Aborigine could not give evidence, he could not
seek legal redress for a crime committed against him either. For liberal colonists, who
hoped to use the law as a mechanism to integrate Aborigines into Australian society,
providing Aborigines with access to the law was a foundation of their strategy of
peaceful accommodation.
The legal history of the measures to legalize Aboriginal evidence is not complex.
The New South Wales Legislative Assembly, the law making body ofthe colony, passed
a law admitting Aboriginal evidence in 1839 after considerable debate. The negative
views turned mostly on the legality of the act under British law. The government of the
colony was solidly behind the measure, both because of the practical necessity of
admitting native evidence, in order to have an effective system of criminal law, but also
because simple equality and justice for Aboriginal people demanded it.3O Governor
Gipps, in control of the Legislative Assembly, brought the measure to the floor in the
wake of the Myall Creek trials; no Aboriginal could testify in the trial of seven whites
charged with the massacre of unknown dozens of natives. The massacre and trial were
an embarrassmentto the colonial government; Gipps was making an effortto assert legal
control over the pastoral frontier.13 1 Still, the measure was a conservative one, not giving
Aboriginal testimony the same weight as whites; it was restricted to criminal cases, and
required corroboration. 32
127 R. v. Billy, November 27, 1840 (unreported) in Parliamentary Papers (P.P.) 1844 (627)
XXXIV at 82-83.
128 William Saxe-Bannister, former Attorney General of New South Wales, so testified before
a Select Committee of the House of Commons. See "Minutes of Evidence to the Report of the Select
Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)" in P.P. 1837 (425) LVII at 17. R. Milliss, supra note
42, recounts the case of a convict who escaped to the Aborigines, who, on his return was pardoned
so that he could be put to work as a police interpreter. Still, such interpreters only understood some
of the broad range of Aboriginal dialects.
,29 These are the grounds of Judge Willis' dismissal of the capital murder charges against Bon
Jon. There should have been many more dismissals on these grounds but none are recorded.
130 Brown, supra note 124 at 35-40.
131 Millis, supra note 42.
132 Brown, supra note 124 at 54-55.
1994]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
Debate over the bill took explicitly racist terms, with many whites seeing the bill as
designed to prosecute whites for "defending" themselves against blacks. The Gipps
government argued that the bill was racially neutral, and would help prosecute blacks
for offenses against whites as well. This racism underlay the Sydney Herald's rhetorical
question, "How could [the Gipps government] introduce a bill legalizing the evidence
of savages in a Court of Law?"'
33
The whole matter, however, turned out to be a dead letter. Crown law officers
refused to recommend Royal assent, and the bill was not approved by the colonial office
because it was "contrary to the principles of British justice".34 Legally, the Colony of
New South Wales could adopt rules of evidence distinct from those of England, and the
Colony had done so, for example, by admitting the evidence of convicts because it was
a necessity under local conditions. The failure of Royal assent is not difficult to explain:
it was the product of conservative Crown lawyers, unversed in colonial conditions. 35
Parliament in 1843, supporting the view of the Colonial Office that the extension
of legal protection to native people in the colonies required the admission of native
evidence, passed, without debate, a measure permitting the colonies to pass laws to admit
unsworn evidence inboth civil and criminal cases. 36 ThisActleftthe Legislative Council
of New South Wales free to re-enact their 1839 bill admitting Aboriginal evidence. The
Australians who supported the measure pressed forward for a new bill, still motivated
by their belief that native people could not receive justice in the courts without their
evidence being admitted. Murrell, now an official position extending British law to
crimes betweenAborigines, created an impossible legal situationifAborigines could not
testify: how could Aborigines be prosecuted for offenses among themselves without any
access to native evidence? 13
7
Since 1842, however, political changes had occurred that had put twenty-four
elected members on the Legislative Council, along with the twelve members nominated
by the Governor. Since the franchise was based on property, those elected represented
propertied interests. These people opposed any extension of legal rights to Aborigines.
Conservative interests opposed any modification of English legal traditions. This
debate, merging the lofty ideals of the common law with racist drivel, characterized
Australian law during the nineteenth century. It was in this debate, for example, that it
was argued by William Wentworth, a wealthy landowner, that: "[I]t would be quite as
defensible to receive as evidence in a court of Justice the chatterings of the ourang-
outang as of this savage race."'138 For Wentworth, and his allies, any extension of legal
rights to Aborigines restricted the rights of settlers to defend their property against
Aborigines. Settlers' resentment ofthe Myall Creek trials and executions played a large
role in these feelings. The bill went down to defeat, fourteen votes to ten. 39 An attempt
to pass a more restrictive bill, limiting Aboriginal testimony to criminal cases and
133 Sydney Herald, 23 September 1839. Cited in Brown, ibid. at 49.
'34 H.R.A., supra note 28 at i, XX, 756.
'35 Brown, supra note 124 at 53.
136 6 & 7 Vict. 22 (1843). Brown, ibid. note 124 at 55-56.
137 Brown, ibid. at 57-63.
131 Ibid. at 72.
139 Ibid. at 74-76.
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requiring corroboration, failed in 1849, ten votes to nine. The debate followed the same
racist lines as in 1844.140
The Legislative Council of New South Wales never directly returned to the matter
ofAboriginal evidence again. Under responsible government any extension oflegal and
political rights to Aborigines was politically impossible because of the racist politics of
landowners and their allies. Aboriginal evidence finally came to be admitted in 1876 as
an unintended consequence of liberal reform on another front; atheists and other non-
believers had their testimony admitted as evidence in England, and there was pressure
to do the same in Australia. While conservatives, citing the importance of belief in God
to the English way of life, opposed the measure, it passed anyway. Although native
evidence was obviously included in the bill, the issue never came up in the legislature
debate.1
41
The failure of either the colonial government, or the Legislative Assembly under
responsible government, to provide for Aboriginal evidence to be admitted in court, is
inconsistent with any view that Aborigines were British citizens. It also is obvious that
there was no way thatAustralian law couldprovide a framework to structure black-white
relations without Aboriginal access to the courts and other legal institutions. This failure
is compounded when it is seen as symbolic; it would have been a simple matter, for
example, to admit the testimony of Aborigines on the theory that local white judges and
juries would ignore it. This, of course, was the normal practice in other colonial legal
settings. It had the advantage of giving the government the benefit of the pretension of
law, yet the flexibility to deny native people justice on evidentiary grounds, on a case
by case basis. New South Wales settlers, probably influencedbytheirconvictbackgrounds
and the Myall Creek trials, were more distrustful of the law, and of their capacity to
control it.
There were other ways of avoiding problems of native evidence. No less a legal
formalist than Chief Justice Francis Forbes found one of them. Faced with a homicide
charge in which the only direct evidence of whether provocation was present was
Bullwaddy, an Aborigine, Forbes convicted the defendant ofimurder and sentenced him
to death. Forbes wrote the Governor alengthy note, pointing outthat when he considered
the convicted murderer's appeal for clemency, he was free ofthe strict rules ofevidence,
hence couldpersonally examine Bullwaddy and decide on the veracity ofhis evidence. 4 2
Similarly, police and magistrates in their investigatory functions were free to use
Aboriginal evidence both to locate the accused and witnesses to cases, and also to decide
what charges ought to be brought.
Where the Colonial Office continued to directly administer the colony, Aboriginal
evidence was admitted after the 1840s. Aboriginal evidence was first admitted in
Western Australia in 1840.' 41 This Act was extended and procedurally elaborated in
1841. It provided that a native could give a signed statement without oath to ajustice of
the peace, who could admit that statement at trial. It would be given whatever weight the
court thought appropriate.'"
140 Ibid. at 77-97.
41 Act No. 8, 40 Vict. 14 (1876). Ibid. at 98-113.
142 Currey, supra note 77 at 103.
143 4 Vict. 8 (1840).
11 4 and 5 Vict. 22 (1841).
1994]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
The legal meaning of the admission of Aboriginal evidence is multi-faceted. On the
one hand, the failure to admit Aboriginal evidence clearly recognized the completely
separate nature of the two social and legal orders; if Aborigines are excluded from
bringing their complaints to colonial courts, it must follow that their own legal forums
are the only appropriate place for those stories. On the other hand, it was clearly a racist
denial of their humanity and the idea of native testimony as the "chatterings of ourang-
outangs" must have been thought, if not stated, by a large number ofwhite Australians.
All elements of Australian law, however, that contributed to the perpetuation of two
parallel legal orders, implicitly deferredto Aboriginal sovereignty. It was not Aboriginal
people who chose to bring their disputes to colonial courts but, rather, colonial
authorities who sought to impose Australian law on native people.
VI. POPULAR JUSTICE: SELF-DEFENSE IN FACT AND LAW
Ifthe legislative debate over the law of evidence shows the limits ofthe capacity of
law to structure Aboriginal/white relations in Australia, the popular justice of colonial
society created another limit on the law. This was an expansive concept of self-defense,
the idea that whites, as a group, were acting in self-defense when they attacked blacks
who, theyperceived, posed athreatto theirlives orproperty. This view provided the legal
justification for white attacks on blacks in Australia until well into the twentieth century.
While the jurisprudence of popularjustice can be analyzed in a number of areas of
substantive law, the law of self-defense is particularly subject to populist social and
political pressure because it turns on the objective reasonableness of an individual's
exercise ofself-defense in one particular fact-specific context as determined by ajury.1
45
While, under British law, the trial judge exercised a great deal ofpower overthis process
through whatwere often very narrow and technical jury instructions, common lawjuries
were always free to apply their own judgment. The social construction of "facts" in
frontier killings were also fluid, subject to a wide range of interpretations. Finally, for
a number of reasons, a defense of self-defense was the most common frontier white
defense to murder charges; it was often the only available defense when confronted with
an obvious killing and, in addition, its fact-specific nature made it relatively easy to raise
successfully, especially with a sympathetic jury. Since murder convictions carried a
mandatory death penalty under British law, the justification of self-defense was
commonly raised by those accused of murder in any context where an interpersonal
altercation might suggest some kind of threatening act by the victim.' 46 Almost any
confrontation between an Aborigine and a white on the frontier fell within the scope of
this defense given the colonial settler mythology of dangerous natives.
While there are no statistics on the number of self-defense claims raised in murder
trials of whites charged with killing Aborigines, because most of these trials led to
verdicts of acquittal and even many of the convictions are not reported, a conservative
estimate is that there were over a hundred nineteenth century Australian trials ofwhites
145 G.P. Fletcher, A Crime ofSelf-Defense: BernhardGoetzandtheLaw on Trial(New York: Free
Press, 1988). The jurisprudence of self-defense is discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
146 Even a failed defense of self-defense often saved the accused's life, since a mistaken (or
excessive) self-defense lowers a murderto a manslaughter at common law because it partially excuses




who usedthe self-defense defense against a charge of murdering a native. For only a few
of these trials is there sufficient information to reconstruct both the underlying facts of
the case, as well as the social and legal context of the trial. The 1872 trial, manslaughter
conviction, and imprisonment ofLockier Clere Burges, a grazier andjustice ofthe peace
in northwestern Western Australia, for the killing of an unnamed Aborigine produced
an elaborate record, including numerous submissions to the Colonial Office.
The case, like many otherkillings ofnative people, would never have come to court
but for the fact that Burges mistreated James Murphy, a teamster who worked for him,
by striking him with a whip because he was driving his horses too fast, and Murphy,
nursing a grudge, reported Burges' killing of a native to the authorities in Perth.
Murphy's claim, based on hearsay because the witnesses to the killing were natives, was
that Burges had pursued and shot in the back an Aborigine who had stolen a saddle from
the grazier's camp. The only witnesses to the killing were two natives that Burges had
also apprehended for stealing the saddle, and who had run away, and Chum Chum, an
Aborigine who worked for Burges as a shepherd.'47
Murphy's evidence came before E.W. Landor, Police Magistrate of Perth, on April
29, 1872, nearly nine months after the October 7, 1871 killing. Although there is some
confusion about the extent of Landor's investigation of the report, Landor eventually
charged Burges with "wounding with intent to murder".'48 This minor charge was no less
than nonsense: the native that Burges had wounded was, in all accounts of the event,
dead, and the same evidence that would prove the former charge would prove the greater
charge. Governor Frederick Weld, citing his duty "to especially take care and to protect
the native inhabitants....and prevent and restrain all violence and injustice which may in
any manner be practiced or attempted against them," suspended Landor for refusing to
commit Burges on a capital charge, while committing him on a minor charge on the same
evidence. 49 While Landor vigorously (and successfully) challenged his suspension,
Burges was re-indicted for murder. The Attorney General personally appeared before
Chief Justice Archibald Burtt and filed an information against Burges, containing nine
counts, including intentional murder. The Chief Justice issued an arrest warrant. Burges
was "shortly arrested", brought to Court, denied bail, and committed to jail. 5"
Without the intervention of Murphy and Governor Weld, Burges' case would never
have been brought to trial. Weld's motivations are not known, but they are not difficult
to surmise. Just like Governor Gipps after the Myall Creek massacre trials, Governor
Weld saw the case through the lens of British justice.51 He clearly did have a legal
responsibility to see to it that some measure of equal justice prevailed in Western
Australia, and that meant that all killings of Aborigines by whites had to be prosecuted
to the full extent of the law. This idea of equal justice for natives and whites, or the idea
,41 Enclosure no.3, "Regina AgainstLockierCere Burges, CopyDepositions, etc." in Dispatches
and Other Papers Relating to Transactions Arising Out of the Homicide and OtherAlleged Outrages
on Aboriginal Natives (Perth: Government Printer, 1873) at 14. The following account of the Burges
trial is taken from this report.
141 Ibid. at 9.
4 Ibid. at 5.
15o Ibid. at 12-13. Answer of Mr. E.W. Landor, Police Magistrate, Perth, Western Australia, to
the charges brought against him by His Excellence The Governor, 11 th June, 1872. Ibid. at 17. Report
of the issue of a warrant by the Chief Justice on the application of the Attorney General, for the arrest
of Mr. Burges, taken from the Perth Gazette newspaper for 7 June 1872.
,51 Milliss, supra note 42.
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that native killings of whites were often in reprisal for white killings of natives were
hardly radical propositions even in the terms of British colonial administration, yet few
colonial governors intervened in individual cases. Governor Weld's personal influence
is clear even inthe earliest minutes onthe case. On February 6, he responded to a concern
of the Attorney General that the case was weak by responding that questions of
credibility should be submitted to the jury.12 His initial report of the case to the Colonial
Secretary stressed his personal disdain for the racism of Western Australian justice: "I
am told that it is openly said that no evidence, however strong, will induce a jury to
convict a white man of a capital offense for killing a native; I take leave to demur to so
sweeping an assertion and one so little creditable to this Colony."'
5 3
The Colonial Office took an interest in the case, apparently as a result of
communications from local officials seeking the intervention of London. As early as
April 30, the Superintendent of Police had submitted documents directly to the Colonial
Secretary, suggesting that some officials were using the Colonial Office to make sure
that the case was moved forward and not buried. 54 Concerns of abuses against
Aborigines, atboth the local level and inthe Colonial Office, influencedthe investigation.
There was also a concern that the violent actions ofindividual whites created an endless
cycle of retaliation that endangered frontier stability. Inspector Piesse's initial report of
the incident feared that "it will be dangerous for persons coming overland from Nichol
Bay, as they will have revenge on the Europeans and kill the first one they can get at."'55
The central difficulty inprosecuting Burges lay in the fact that Chum Chum, the only
witness, was an Aborigine. In 1872 Aborigines were competent witnesses in Western
Australia, so all legal barriers to his testimony had been removed.5 6 But for Inspector
Piesse, the fact that Chum Chum lived with Burges meant that he was under Burges'
influence and would say anything Burges wanted. For Piesse the solutionto this problem
was simple, but raised problems of its own; if Chum Chum were removed from the
influence of Burges, he would be willing to testify against him, but then there was the
danger that Chum Chum was only testifying that way to please the police, his new
master. 5 7 Chum Chum's credibility posed an insoluble problem for Piesse, and he
requested guidance on how to proceed. Governor Weld dismissed these concerns,
believing that the whole matter of credibility was for the jury.
Chum Chum, when interrogated by Police Magistrate Landor, gave an account of
the killing that must have been strikingly like thousands of other killings of natives in
colonial Australia. Burges, with a party ofsix whites and a similarnumber ofAborigines,
was bringing a flock of sheep from Nichol Bay to Champion Bay. Seven natives ofatribe
Chum Chum did not know followed the flock for ten or eleven miles. While Burges had
given strict orders to keep natives out of the camp, they came in one evening, bringing
a sheep dog that the party had lost. Over night, a saddle and some clothing disappeared.
In the morning Burges went to look for the saddle, but could not find it. Later, one of his
native servants found the saddle, and Burges rode off alone to find the natives who took
it. Chum Chum went after Burges, intending to find him.
1-52 Currey, supra note 77 at 7.
153 ibid. at 3.
Im4 Ibid. at 8.
'15 Ibid. at 7.
156 4 Vict. 8 (1840); 4 and 5 Vict. 22 (1841).
'37 Currey, supra note 77 at 7.
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Burges was returning toward the flock. Chum Chum saw five natives running away.
Burges told Chum Chum to hold two of them, and rode after a third native, beating him
on the head with a pistol. Burges then returned to Chum Chum, saying that they would
take the two back to the flock and flog them. One ofthe two, afraid to go back to the flock,
ran away. Burges pursued him on horseback and, from a distance ofthree or four yards
fired one shot at the man's back. He tumbled to the ground and lay still, face down, and
did not move. Burges did not approach him to see if he was dead, but returned to Chum
Chum andthey tookthe remaining native back to the camp. Burges told the men in camp
that he had shot a native. 58
Because of the notoriety of the case, and the fact that Chum Chum was the only
witness, local authorities dispatched apolice investigator over athousand miles to search
for evidence of the case, a journey that took almost two months. Such an investigation
a year after a murder could produce only one piece of evidence, the remains of an
unknown Aboriginal male, dead of a bullet wound. On July 11 Chum Chum lead the
investigators to the exact spot in the desert where Burges had shot the man. A number
ofbones and a skull were there, on a spot four feet long, the earth covered by dried blood.
One of the shoulder blade bones had a hole in it; the other had been taken away by dogs.
No weapons of any kind were found. The tracks of one horse followed the body to a
distance of fourteen yards, then abruptly stopped, as though the horse were pulled
back. 9 Other than Chum Chum's error in estimating the distance between Burges and
the man he shot, every piece of evidence that Chum Chum gave was corroborated.
Piesse, with the aid of native trackers, found out that white men driving sheep had shot
and killed a native named Muekellwellyer on the other side of Hooley's Well because
he stole something. 60
Burges, arrested by William Timperly, Inspector of Police, admitted the shooting,
but was unflappable in offering his defense. "I never did, and never will, deny that I shot
that native, but I did not expect to be charged with murder." He was pursuing the men
intending to take them back to his camp. The first man, the one that he had hit with his
revolver, had attempted to take his leg and throw him off his horse. The man who was
shot, threw a stone and ran, and Burges had pursued him. The native turned, and attacked
Burges, who shot him in self-defense. By way of his own corroboration, Burges had
written this account in his diary. However, he had never mentioned the attack in telling
the story to his men, saying simply that he had shot a native. 61
At trial on September 4, 1872, it seems that no one involved with the case believed
Burges' statement about the attack, and that his killing of Muekellwellyer was a cold-
blooded murder, running down and shooting in the back one member of a small band
of natives suspected of petty theft, the kind of murder of natives that was common in
nineteenth century Australia. Burges, amazed at the investigation against him, had
ample opportunity to fabricate a story but did not put on a significant defense. He did
not take the stand himself, a necessity in a self-defense claim, but relied on his lawyer's
attack on the credibility of the witnesses against him.
1s8 Ibid. at 8-9.
's9 Ibid. at 35-36.
160 Ibid. at 36-37.
161 Ibid. at 38.
1994]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
The trial took two days with Chum Chum the lead witness. While Chum Chum's
testimony differed in slight detail from his deposition, the core of the cross examination
by Mr. Parker, Burges' attorney, was on the general credibility of Chum Chum as a
witness. Chum Chum was now a police constable and his loyalty to his new employer
at the expense of his former employer was an issue. During his deposition he had said
"Governor will be pleased if I tell the truth, Mr. Burges, no," with Parker drawing the
inference that Chum Chum was testifying for his new master, a white stereotype of
Aboriginal reliability as witnesses. Parker further got Chum Chum to admit that he had
been fined for drinking.
62
Murphy testified that Burges returned to camp stating that he had shot a native, "I
dropped one of them and he never kicked." On cross examination, Parker focused both
on Murphy's dispute with Burges, as well as his alleged bragging in a Perth tavern that
"that bloody swine has bested me and I will best him, I will swear his life away." Re-
examined by the Attorney General, Murphy admitted that he had been drunk in many
Perthtaverns and had freelytalked aboutthe case, buthe furthertestified that Burges had
claimed that he had shot down the native "like a dog". Ironically, Murphy seems to have
held up well as a witness, appearing exactly as he was: a hard drinking teamster full of
anger towards Burges for whipping him, but his evidence was straightforward, and
corroborated both Burges' statement to the police and Chum Chum's testimony.
63
Police Inspector Timperly testified to the statements that Burges had made to him,
admitting that he shot a native, but claiming self-defense. Through Timperly, defense
attorneys introduced Burges' diary, in which Burges had written "he tried to throw his
dowark at me, but I fired at him and shot him." Sub-inspector Piesse testified to finding
the body at Hooley's Well. Charles Bompas, a surgeon, testified that the body Piesse had
foundwas an adultAborigine male, and hadbeenthere less thantwelve months. The hole
in the shoulder blade of the body was caused by a bullet passing through the body of a
man standing, holding his hand up slightly. The hand was also fractured, eitherby a bullet
or by a sharp blow. 64 This testimony closed the Crown's case.
The next day the defense's case took only a few hours, a strange abdication that may
indicate overconfidence. Jacob, a native who was with Burges and now lived with his
brother, was called and testified that Chum Chum had told him that the native was
attacking Burges and was going to throw a dowark, and that if Chum Chum had not been
there Burges would have been killed. 6 ' Alfred Smith, a servant of Burges, testified that
Murphy had threatened Burges, and that the natives had "dowarks, about two feet long,
and thick as my wrist", but gave no evidence on the shooting. Michael Carpenter, a
prisoner, was called to say that he had met Murphy "sober" in a tavern in Perth and that
Murphy had said thathe was going to "make thebloody buggerpay forit, and swear away
his life, right or wrong."
The defense was inadequate and can only be explained by the lawyer's belief that
no white man could be convicted on Chum Chum's evidence for the killing of a native.
The trial judge, with the formalistic view of the law of self-defense common in British
law of the day, took most of that problem away from the jury. He gave very detailedjury
instructions, deciding most of the questions raised by the case against Burges. Since
162 Ibid.
10 Ibid. at 38-39.
164 Ibid. at 40.
161 Ibid. at 63.
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Burges did not have the legal right to detain or punish anyone, the narrow issue was
whether Burges' arrest of the native was lawful. If it was not for a lawful purpose, then
the native had a right to resist it, and Burges was not legally entitled to the claim of self-
defense. "The Party slaying another under such necessity must himself be wholly
without fault in bringing that necessity upon himself." Thus, the question ofwhetherthe
man threatened Burges with a dowarkwas irrelevant. Although Burges had not admitted
that he intended to flog the native, he had never claimed any legal purpose in his pursuit
of the natives. Burges, the court instructed the jury, was legally obligated to promptly
deliver Muekellwellyer to the nearest magistrate. Any other purpose amounted to an
illegal arrest. That was the end of the case. The Perth jury followed the judge's
instructions and convicted in fifty minutes. Burges was found guilty of manslaughter
under the common law doctrine that mistaken self-defense reduces the mens rea of
murder to manslaughter. The judge sentenced him to five years in Freemantlejail, very
hard time for a grazier and former justice of the peace. 66
The conviction was immediately the matter of controversy, with many rushing to
Burges' defense, demanding his release from prison. While some of the pleas were
personal, coming from Burges' well connected family, others were legal, arguments
about the nature of the law of self-defense between whites and natives in colonial
Australia. Clearly, Chief Justice Burtt's charge of the jury with a narrow and technical
formulation of the law of self-defense that, by definition, left Burges guilty, was the
easiest line of attack on the conviction. IfBurges had any right at all to pursue the natives
with the idea of locating his property, then he was acting "wholly without fault" and was
entitled to have the reasonableness of his exercise of self-defense submitted to the jury.
If the only legal purpose that Burges could have had in approaching a native was to effect
a lawful arrest and transport his prisoner to the nearest justice of the peace, the law was
demanding the impossible.' 67 Burges had a flock ofsheep and the nearest magistrate was
280 miles away. But, at the same time, the Chief Justice's formulation of the law was a
bright line, absolutely giving native people the full protection of the law, and requiring
whites to use the law in resolving their disputes with native people.
Much of the criticism of the decision, however, was cast in broader terms, taking
in the entire nature of white-native relations in Australia. The most detailed social and
political defense of Burges was a letter sent to the Perth Inquirer by Maitland Brown,
the Justice ofthe Peace in Geraldton, and a council delegate from Geraldton. Ironically,
ifBurges had arrested Muekellwellyer and taken him before a Justice, the nearest Justice
would have been Maitland Brown in Geraldton. Brown's position was editorially
endorsed by the Inquirer, the leading newspaper of Western Australia. 6 '
Brown began his argumentwith the grazier's political position thatwhen the colony
"will not guarantee protection" to its citizens beyond the reach of the law, they have a
broad moral right to act in their own defense. In this respect Brown emphasized that
Burges had done nothing more than any police officer would do when investigating the
theft ofthe saddle. This included pursuing the thief and using reasonable force to defend
'66 Ibid. at 42-43.
167 Ibid. at 44-45.
168 Ibid. at 54-60. "Petition, Correspondence, and Other Matter in the Case of Lockier Clere
Burges, Jun., for Transmission to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies: Perth, February
1873". This material was printed as a pamphlet and must have had wide distribution in Western
Australia, a colony with a small population in 1872.
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himself, indeed evento effect an arrest.'69 This recastthe whole issue ofthe use ofBritish
law to structure white-native relations on the frontier, and denied the whole legitimacy
of Governor Weld's attempt to use the law to ensure equality and fairness to natives on
the frontiers of Western Australia. As long as Governor Weld was unable to extend
British law to the frontiers to protect grazier's property rights, he was notmorally entitled
to extend it there to protect native rights.
Brown went farbeyondthis, attackingthe central presumption in the ChiefJustice's
charge to the jury, that Burges' only legal right was to arrest Muekellwellyer and take
himbefore amagistrate. According to Brown "no magistrate in Western Australia would
have issued a warrant for the arrest of the natives who committed the depredation." In
support of this, Brown cited Land Regulations proclaimed on March 20, 1872, stating
"No protection or Governmental establishment in the North or East district will be
guaranteed to the public until deemed expedient by the Government." Since the
government guaranteed no protection in those districts, it followed that no magistrate
would issue a warrant for an arrest in those districts because there were no police to go
there to execute the warrants.
1 70
While Burges evidently intended to flog Muekellwellyer, these facts did not clearly
come out at the trial, and Burges, himself, denied such intent. The law made express
provision for a flogging of two dozen lashes in addition to imprisonment in such cases,
asserted Brown, and Burges had only intended to.inflict the lashes, a lessor punishment
than the law provided. Moreover, for the native offense of carelessly lighting fire to the
.bush, the law provided for a punishment of fifty lashes.'7' Brown defended Burges' right
to flog the natives as doing no more than what the law allowed. Brown's assertion here,
as a colonial magistrate, is that on the frontier, absent the legal protection of the Perth
government, Burges was legally entitled to act as judge, jury, and executioner, exactly
to the limit of Western Australia law. This legal opinion was obviously widespread in
frontier Australia in the nineteenth century.
Nor was it fair to judge Burges' actions in using deadly force over the theft of a
saddle in a context unfamiliar with the reality of the frontier. A saddle was not merely
a piece of property of small value, but was absolutely necessary to make a horse useful
in a sheep drive. The loss of a saddle endangered the life of the man who needed to ride
the horse, and was a far more serious matter than an ordinary theft.
Sensing that many of his legal arguments were of doubtful quality, Brown argued
that Burges' actions were not "morally wrong" even if they were legally wrong. Freely
citing the deity as authority, Brown made a number of arguments based on natural law
and the natural law right to self-defense.7
Finally, Brown's argumentturned on racism, the savage character of natives on the
Australian frontier. Analogizing to the power of a "pensioner" posted as a guard over
convicts who has the clear power to shoot them when they attempt to escape, he argued
that it was unjust to imprison Burges for killing a savage in exactly the same position,
169 Ibid. at 54.
170 ibid. at 55.
'7' Ibid. Brown cited the action of the explorer Stanley Livingston, who had forcibly seized
supplies from natives in Zanzibar. It logically followed that if Livingston had killed one of those
natives in the course of effecting this seizure, he would not be guilty of murder because, since his




an argument which ignores the fact that the guard is acting under the authority of law,
while Burges was not. Brown himself had "more than once been brought into hostile
collision with natives" and had been imputed "dark deeds which I thank God His power
prevented me from committing."'' What happened to Burges, by this logic, could have
happened to Brown, or any other white on the frontier.
While Governor Weld resisted this pressure, the Colonial Secretary did not, and
Burges' sentence was reduced to one year imprisonment. 174 This did not satisfy Burges'
defenders, who continued to argue that he deserved a pardon. 7 5 Nor did it satisfy
Governor Weld who insisted, in a dispatch to the Colonial Secretary, that the evidence
clearly showed that Burges had shot Muekellwellyer (still without using his name) in the
back in cold blood, which made him guilty of murder rather than manslaughter. Weld
believed that thejury had been lenientwithBurges, in part out of fear ofpublic retaliation
against "marked men" for convicting a white ofmurder in the killing of an Aborigine.' 76
The Burges trial provoked an interest on the part of the Colonial Office with the
whole matter ofjustice in interracial killings in Western Australia. In the previous ten
years there had been five prosecutions of whites for killing natives and three of natives
for killing whites. Four of the whites had been convicted of manslaughter, with one
acquitted by reason of insanity and under detention as criminally insane. All of the
natives were convicted and hanged. 77
Colonial Australia produced a law of self-defense that was structured by white
racism. At the outset, white killings of natives were reduced to manslaughter almost
automatically, a province ofthejury for any reason. The law of self-defense turned both
on questions of fact that were, as seen in Burges' case, highly subjective, often without
corroboration, and an objective judgment about the level of force necessary to preserve
white lives in ordinary frontier activities, such as stock-driving. Burges had driven a
flock of sheep nearly a thousand miles with only friendly contacts with natives, but for
whites itwas ahostile environment, requiring vigilance- andpotential violence, at every
step.
17 Ibid.
174 Ibid. at 43-44.
175 Ibid. at 54.
176 Ibid. at 61-63. Weld's reading of the evidence is instructive: "Take this in connection with
Murphy's evidence that he was given a native prisoner and a gun, and ordered by L.C. Burges to "drop"
(or shoot) the native if he attempted to escape; with Chum Chum's evidence; with L.C. Burges' entry
in the journal; with his statement to Inspector Timperley about the native's picking up a stone, which
he would not have done had he had a dowark; with the presumption that he would have probably
disarmed the native when first taken had he been armed; with the presumption that which L.C. Burges
was alone, and with seven wild and "bloodthirsty" natives by him, whom he was endeavouringto drive
to camp, they would have assailed him with those deadly weapons had they had any; with the
presumption that after shooting the native, L.C. Burges would have carried away his dowark as a
trophy, a memorial, or aproof, had there been a dowark to carry away; with the fact that after shooting
the native he nevereven rode up to him but left him like a dog; with the expressions in evidence as used
by him, "he dropped and never kicked", "hardly worth while (not to avoid a possible blow, but) for
the sake of thirty shillings", "my friend screwed himself away from me": all this mass or concurrent
evidence, each part dovetailing into the other, leads to the belief that he was not firing in self-defence,
but vindictively to kill a man, who was escaping, and who would not stop" (at 62).
'7 Ibid. at 5, 87 and 97.
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VII. CONCLUSION
These isolated looks at distinct pieces of legal doctrine in nineteenth century
Australia clearly show one thing at the outset; the legal history of Australia is far from
a legal terra nullius. Aborigines were everywhere in Australia, and the structuring of
white-native relations was a recurrent issue in nineteenth century Australian law. Resort
to formal legal mechanisms ebbed and flowed with a broad range ofpolitical and social
factors. The prosecution and conviction of Lockier Burges, like that of the men who
committed the Myall Creek massacre, was partially a fortuity, but the legal mechanisms
were in place for a number of such trials that ran into the hundreds.
Muekellwellyer was never named in any of the formal court documents in Burges'
trial, eventhoughInspectorPiesse identified himtwo monthsbeforethetrial. Undoubtedly,
thousands ofhis countrymen, also unnamed, were murderedmuch as he was; many more
thousands flogged. There is an underlying legal structure here that it is transparent.
Burges was tried, not because he murdered Muekellwellyer, but because he lost his
temper and whipped James Murphy because he did not like the way Murphy drove his
team. Murphy, a man of fewer means and less political power, got even with Burges the
best way he knew how. Muekellwellyer's people fell back to the North to regroup and
carry on their lives. They did not passively accept his death. They spread word of how
he was killed up and down the coast of Northwestern Australia. Apparently, following
their own law, they planned to avenge his death, and, in the belief of Governor Weld,
may well have done so. Their land was contested land, not terra nullius; theirlegal norms
were well enough known so that Inspector Piesse was sent to pacify them by assuring
them that Burges was punished under British law. The theft of the saddle, for unknown
reasons, may have been a legal act, unrecognized by Australian law.
Colonial justice was a delicate balancing act, involving some ofthe form of British
justice, but with a popular character that the British Colonial Office deferred to. Lord
Kimberley put this directly in his remission of Burges' sentence, while he recognized
both that Weld had done his duty to secure equal justice for Aborigines, and respected
the quality of the verdict and did not think there was any error in the trial, "in order that
a healthypublic opinionmayprevail in the Colony on this subject, it is essential thatthere
should be no ground for a feeling that extreme severity has been effected" against
Burges.17
8
All of this demolishes any pretext of a legal inference denying an Aboriginal right
to land based on the failure of nineteenth century Australian law to recognize Aboriginal
rights. In a defacto way, Australian law dealt with complex questions of Aboriginal
rights in a wide variety of ways. While graziers, like Burges, had a range of legal rights
to move their flocks across wide expanses of land, that right was only unlimited in the
legal culture of the graziers, a legal culture represented by Maitland Brown and Lockier
Burges. Muekellwellyer and Chum Chum had a legal culture as well. The legal culture
of the former was aimed at maintaining an integrity of native rights on the frontier. The
legal culture of the latter was more assimilationist, but it was to make sure that
Muekellwellyer and his people got justice in the white man's court. Weld and Kimberly
represented a third legal culture, one that tried to mediate the other two. Theirs imposed
178 Ibid. at 43-44.
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the formality of British law on two societies that did not want it. Because of this highly
imperfect fit, and great local resistance, the formality of British law was always
compromised with local political reality, as indeed it was in Britain.7 9 Native interests
were not represented in local politics. That, however, is a different questionthanwhether
nativepeoplehad recognized sovereignty andland rights innineteenth century Australia.
They actedlikethey did, as sovereignpeople exercisingpolitical control overtheirlands;
Australians treated them like they did, either staying offtheir lands, or only entering them
with armed forces always on the alert for native attacks in defense of their land.
The legal history of Aboriginal rights in nineteenth century Australia is far from a
legal terra nullius. It is a rich and complex history, only partially written. While the self
defense trial ofLockier Burges is carefully recorded in Australian legal history because
his people had a written legal order, the self defense cases of Muekellwellyer's people
are not recorded in writing. If Muekellwellyer had killed Burges that day by managing
to pick up a stone and knocking him off his horse as he drew aim to kill him, there would
be no written record ofthe case. Rather, the case would have disappeared into the cycle
of frontier violence and retaliation that characterizes the absence of law in Australian
legal history. Butthewhite choiceto use ornotto use law is alegal choice, andthehistory
ofthat process is a legal history. Native people did not have those choices. It would have
been impossible for any of Muekellwellyer's people to find a magistrate and prefer
charges against Burges. That fell to James Murphy, one drunk and angry teamster, who
bragged in every tavern in Perth that he would perjure himself and put Burges away -
and still had more credibility and more access to British and Australian law than all of
Muekellwellyer's people. They had their own law, however, and formost ofnineteenth
century Australia that was sufficient for them. Any re-thinking of the legal history of
Aboriginal Australians needs to take account of Aborigine law and legal history, as well
as its opposite, the legal structuring ofwhite choices (and opportunities) to avoid colonial
law, both central elements of the history of native rights in Australia.
179 D. Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law" in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and
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